Theorizing Mental Health Courts by Johnston, E. Lea
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 3 
2012 
Theorizing Mental Health Courts 
E. Lea Johnston 
University of Florida 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the 
Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519 (2012). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
519 
THEORIZING MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
E. LEA JOHNSTON

 
ABSTRACT 
To date, no scholarly article has analyzed the theoretical basis of 
mental health courts, which currently exist in forty-three states. This 
Article examines the two utilitarian justifications proposed by mental 
health court advocates—therapeutic jurisprudence and therapeutic 
rehabilitation—and finds both insufficient. Therapeutic jurisprudence is 
inadequate to justify mental health courts because of its inability, by 
definition, to resolve significant normative conflict. In essence, mental 
health courts express values fundamentally at odds with those underlying 
the traditional criminal justice system. Furthermore, the sufficiency of 
rehabilitation, as this concept appears to be defined by mental health 
court advocates, depends on the validity of an assumed link between 
mental illness and crime. In particular, mental health courts view 
participants’ criminal behavior as symptomatic of their mental illnesses 
and insist that untreated mental illness serves as a major driver of 
recidivism. Drawing upon social science research and an independent 
analysis of mental health courts’ eligibility criteria, this Article 
demonstrates that these relationships may not hold for a substantial 
proportion of individuals served by mental health courts. The Article 
concludes by identifying alternative theories that may justify this novel 
diversion intervention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fueled by federal funding,
1
 approximately 250 mental health courts 
now exist in forty-three states.
2
 While no single definition of “mental 
 
 
 1. See Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, 
118 Stat. 2327 (2004) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa) (authorizing funding, training, and technical 
assistance for collaborative efforts between criminal justice and mental health agencies, including 
mental health courts); America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (granting 
funding for the development or expansion of mental health courts).  
 2. Henry J. Steadman et al., Effect of Mental Health Courts on Arrests and Jail Days, 68 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 167 (2011), available at http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/ 
abstract/archgenpsychiatry.2010.134v1; NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, GRADING THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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health court” enjoys universal agreement,3 the term generally describes a 
specialized court for certain defendants with mental illnesses who choose 
to eschew traditional court processing in favor of a problem-solving 
approach involving court-ordered and court-supervised treatment.
4
 
Currently, mental health courts vary in the charges and mental illness 
diagnoses they accept, their consideration of individuals with a history of 
violence, plea requirements, treatments offered, intensity and length of 
supervision, potential sanctions, and the impact of program completion on 
participants’ criminal cases.5 Mental health courts may follow a pre- or 
post-adjudication model.
6
 While early mental health courts typically 
limited eligibility to individuals charged with misdemeanors, mental 
health courts have increasingly opened their doors to accused felons and 
violent felons.
7
 Mirroring the expressed purpose of the Mentally Ill 
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, which authorizes 
 
 
STATES: A REPORT ON AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR ADULTS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL 
ILLNESS 42 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/gtsTemplate09.cfm?Section=Grading_the_ 
States_2009&Template=/contentmanagement/contentdisplay.cfm&ContentID=75019.  
 3. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, A GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/Guide-MHC-Design.pdf 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN]. 
 4. See LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO 
RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2009), available at http://consensusproject.org/jc_ 
publications/mental-health-courts-a-guide-to-research-informed-policy-and-practice/Mental_Health_Court 
_Research_Guide.pdf; COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A 
PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 4 (2008), available at http://consensusproject 
.org/jc_publications/mental-health-courts-a-primer-for-policymakers-and-practitioners/mhc-primer.pdf 
[hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A PRIMER]. For a list of elements common to early and 
“second generation” mental health courts, see Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their 
Promise and Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457 (2001) and Allison D. Redlich et 
al., The Second Generation of Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 527 (2005), 
respectively. This Article does not address the other functions that may be served by mental health 
courts, such as competence restoration. 
 5. GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN, supra note 3, at 28–35, 38–43 (a fairly 
comprehensive account of the operations of thirty-seven federally funded mental health courts). The 
Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program has issued a number 
of publications concerning mental health courts that can be found online at http://www 
.consensusproject.org/issue_areas/courts. An online database of individual mental health court profiles 
is maintained by the Council of State Governments’ Justice Center, at http://consensusproject 
.org/programs_start. For a list of additional policy guides and web resources on mental health courts, 
see MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A PRIMER, supra note 4, at 20–22. 
 6. See GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN, supra note 3, at 38–40; Redlich et al., 
Second Generation, supra note 4, at 534–35. 
 7. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 7–9 (reporting the findings of several studies—
including a 2006 survey of eighty-seven mental health courts that found that 40 percent accepted only 
misdemeanants, 10 percent only accepted felons, and 50 percent accepted misdemeanants and felons—
and concluding that mental health courts are increasingly likely to accept individuals charged with 
violent crimes). 
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federal funding for mental health courts,
8
 the primary goal of most mental 
health courts is to reduce recidivism, typically defined in terms of new 
arrests or convictions.
9
  
It is unclear whether mental health courts actually reduce recidivism 
and, to the extent they do, what accounts for that success.
10
 Mental health 
court staff and participants have provided strong anecdotal support for the 
ability of these courts to decrease criminal behavior and increase treatment 
compliance,
11
 and it appears that participants’ experience with the courts 
has largely been positive. Most research to date has been descriptive rather 
than evaluative, however, and the quality of the research has varied 
significantly.
12
 Most studies are marred by methodological shortcomings,
13
 
 
 
 8. See Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, S. 1194, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108s1194enr/pdf/BILLS-108s1194enr.pdf (“The purpose of this 
Act is to increase public safety by facilitating collaboration among the criminal justice, juvenile 
justice, mental health treatment, and substance abuse systems.”). 
 9. See, e.g., David Cooke, Diversion from Prosecution: A Scottish Experience, in WHAT 
WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING 173, 185 (James McGuire ed., 1995) (arguing that reconviction 
rates, the typical outcome measure used in treatment programs for offenders with mental illnesses, are 
the most sensible measure of success because “[r]econviction is the one objective criterion that can be 
applied irrespective of the presenting psychological problem, or the therapeutic approach adopted in 
tackling this problem,” “can be used to determine whether the public interest is being well served” by 
programs, and “may assist in the identification of appropriate and non-appropriate referrals”); Sarah L. 
Miller & Abigayl M. Perelman, Mental Health Courts: An Overview and Redefinition of Tasks and 
Goals, 33 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 113, 122 (2009) (characterizing available research as suggesting that 
the primary objective of mental health courts is to influence criminal justice outcomes, such as number 
of arrests and recidivism rates).  
 10. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21 (observing that very little empirical evidence 
exists on the impact of mental health courts and that “[w]hat is not yet known is why some individuals 
do well in mental health courts and others do not, or why certain programs seem to be more effective 
than others.”) (emphasis in original); Steven K. Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts: 
Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 335, 337 
(2006) (remarking that “the paucity of research regarding [mental health courts’] effectiveness is 
noteworthy.”). For a recent evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of mental health courts, see Richard 
Frank & Thomas G. McGuire, Mental Health Treatment and Criminal Justice Outcomes 29–30, 36 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15858, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1583799 (concluding that some, but not all, evaluations of mental health courts show a 
reduction in criminal activity but that little evidence connects the mental treatment component of the 
courts to decreases in recidivism). 
 11. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21; Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on 
Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 507 (2005) (“The efficacy of the mental 
health court model has not as yet been demonstrated empirically, although some anecdotal reports 
have suggested that it is a promising development.”).  
 12. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21–22; CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, INTERVENTION FACT SHEET: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (2009), 
available at http://www.cbhs-cjr.rutgers.edu/pdfs/MentalHealthCourts.pdf (“Although there are 
numerous descriptive accounts and anecdotal assessments of the positive impact of [mental health 
courts], little reliable research has been done to assess the impact of [mental health courts] on the 
behavioral health, criminal justice, or employment futures of those who have participated in [mental 
health courts].”) (emphasis in original); Arthur J. Lurigio & Jessica Snowden, Putting Therapeutic 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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such as including inadequate outcome measures and short follow-up 
periods, which limit their worth.
14
 The few rigorous studies that have been 
published have reached generally positive but inconsistent conclusions,
15
 
ranging from finding no effect on re-arrest rate to a decrease in recidivism 
by mental health court participants of fifteen percent at eighteen months.
16
 
Some forensic psychologists have suggested that, to the extent mental 
health courts do reduce recidivism, this result may stem from courts’ 
attendance to needs that are unrelated to offenders’ mental illnesses.17 
While it is certainly important, as an empirical matter, to determine the 
extent to which mental health courts reduce recidivism, the concern of this 
Article is largely theoretical. Its guiding thesis is that a coherent theoretical 
justification should support the decision to create a separate system of 
 
 
Jurisprudence into Practice: The Growth, Operations, and Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 
JUST. SYS. J. 196, 197 (2009). 
 13. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21–22 (listing methodological shortcomings of 
most studies); CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 12; 
Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 197, 214; Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 539, 540 (2005) (explaining that 
the descriptive evaluations of mental health courts have all the limitations of early drug court 
evaluations, which include poor research designs and methods).  
 14. ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21–22 (noting that most studies did not follow 
participants beyond twelve months); CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESEARCH, supra note 12 (explaining that no randomized controlled trial of mental health courts has 
been conducted, and the evidence that exists is based on small numbers of clients, non-equivalent 
comparison groups, and short follow-up periods); Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 197. 
 15. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 21, 23–25; Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 
197; Jennifer L. Skeem, Sarah Manchak & Jillian K. Peterson, Correctional Policy for Offenders with 
Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 
113, 115 (2010) (Tables 1, 2).  
 16. See Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 113, 115 (Tables 1, 2); cf. ALMQUIST & 
DODD, supra note 4, at 21–25 (reviewing peer-reviewed studies whose methodological rigor meets 
minimal standards and concluding that preliminary evidence suggests that mental health court 
participation is associated with lower recidivism rates). A recent, particularly well-designed study 
funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation found that mental health court 
participation resulted in a lower annualized re-arrest rate, fewer post-eighteen-month arrests, and fewer 
post-eighteen-month incarceration days than treatment as usual. See Steadman et al., Effect of Mental 
Health Courts on Arrests and Jail Days, supra note 2 (utilizing an experimental design that included 
treatment and comparison samples from multiple locales). The study found that both clinical and 
criminal justice factors—but particularly criminogenic factors—were associated with better public 
safety outcomes among mental health court participants. Id. at 167, 171. These factors included lower 
pre-eighteen-month arrests and incarceration days, treatment at baseline, refraining from using illegal 
substances, and a diagnosis of bipolar disorder (as opposed to schizophrenia or depression). Id. at 171. 
 17. See Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 120 (“[T]o the extent that staff intuitively 
focus on changing an individual’s general risk factors for crime, programs may be more effective in 
reducing criminal behavior than those that bank more exclusively on psychiatric services.”); id. at 121 
(suggesting that programs like mental health courts are more likely to be effective when they apply 
core correctional practices, mitigate the criminogenic effects of unhealthy social environments (like by 
providing supported employment), and target factors that “get an offender in trouble” (like antisocial 
influences)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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justice for a historically stigmatized population.
18
 In essence, some theory 
of sentencing or social welfare should be capable of explaining why it is 
appropriate to segregate offenders with mental illnesses and why coercive 
treatment is more appropriate for these individuals than traditional 
sentencing. In addition, once a potential justification has been identified, 
any empirical assumptions necessary to the internal coherence of that 
theory should survive scrutiny.
19
 If existing evidence contradicts necessary 
presuppositions—or if a coherent theory supporting the existence of the 
courts cannot be identified at all—then the legitimacy of the mental health 
court venture is in doubt.
20
  
Thus far, commentators have largely limited their inquiries to the 
practical effects of mental health courts. In particular, some commentators 
have criticized the emasculated role of defense counsel in mental health 
courts
21
 and the courts’ net-widening effects.22 Others have expressed 
concerns about the coercive nature of the courts,
23
 offenders’ competence 
 
 
 18. Persons with mental illnesses have suffered isolation and stigmatization throughout our 
nation’s history. See, e.g., Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health 
Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 315, 349–50 (1995). The findings 
in the Americans with Disabilities Act stress that, “historically, society has tended to isolate and 
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(2) (2006).  
 19. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 1, 4 (Jeffrie G. 
Murphy ed., 1973) (explaining that philosophical theories may presuppose empirical claims for their 
truth or intelligibility and that philosophers have an obligation to keep informed of relevant scientific 
work pertaining to their theoretical presuppositions). 
 20. See Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health 
Courts, 30(3) J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 431, 433–34 (2002). 
 21. See Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and 
the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1459, 1483 (2004); Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ 
Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 
22 QLR 811, 825, 838–40, 844–45 (2004); Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-
Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 1, 1–55 (2006); Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 337, 340; Wolff & Pogorzelski, supra note 
13, at 558–59; see also Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway: Musings of a Public Defender 
about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 37 (2001) [hereinafter 
Whose Team] (analyzing and critiquing the role of defense counsel in context of drug treatment 
courts).  
 22. See Allison D. Redlich et al., Patterns of Practice in Mental Health Courts: A National 
Survey, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 348 (2006); Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts: A 
Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of People with Mental 
Illness, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 570, 581–82 (2005); Faraci, supra note 21, at 850; Stefan & 
Winick, supra note 11, at 518. 
 23. See Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illness: The 
Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143, 150–51 (2003); Casey, 
supra note 21, at 1498–99; Faraci, supra note 21, at 845–47; Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, But 
Knowing and Intelligent?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 605 (2005); Seltzer, supra note 22, at 574–
75, 582; Stefan & Winick, supra note 11, at 512.  
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to consent to diversion,
24
 and infringement on participants’ privacy.25 
Finally, others have pointed to the increased discretionary power and 
partiality of specialty court judges
26
 and the potential of these courts to 
divert resources from law-abiding individuals with mental illnesses.
27
  
This Article marks the first attempt to canvass and scrutinize 
theoretical justifications for mental health courts.
28
 To date, mental health 
court judges and advocates have identified two utilitarian theories to 
justify the existence of the courts:
29
 therapeutic jurisprudence and a narrow 
form of rehabilitation.
30
 Therapeutic jurisprudence is the most popular 
justification for mental health courts.
31
 This academic discipline, 
developed in the early 1990s by Professors David B. Wexler and Bruce J. 
Winick,
32
 encourages the use of social science to investigate the ways in 
which a legal rule or practice affects the psychological and physical well-
 
 
 24. See Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 339; Faraci, supra note 21, at 846–47; Lurigio & 
Snowden, supra note 12, at 206; K. Stafford & R. Wygant, The Role of Competency to Stand Trial in 
Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 245 (2005).  
 25. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 23, at 159.  
 26. See id. at 156–57; John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the 
Nature and Limitations of Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 97, 113–14 (2007); Casey, supra 
note 21, at 1491–93, 1497–1500; Faraci, supra note 21, at 838–43; Wolff & Pogorzelski, supra note 
13, at 556, 558–59.  
 27. See Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 341; Faraci, supra note 21, at 848; Lurigio & Snowden, 
supra note 12, at 212; Seltzer, supra note 22, at 581.  
 28. The focus of this Article is on the extent to which a theory of social risk or punishment 
supports the creation of mental health courts. It does not address the practical reasons why mental 
health courts might have been created, such as states’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate 
mental health treatment in jails and prisons. 
 29. Utilitarian theories of punishment hold that an infliction of punishment is justified as a means 
to increase social welfare by reducing future crime. See Jeremy Bentham, On the Principle of Utility, 
in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 19, at 64, 66–68 & n.2. Utilitarian theories or 
methods include deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment 
Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (briefly 
defining the three utilitarian theories); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION, supra note 19, at 18, 22–23 (“By reforming the criminal, by deterring him or others 
from similar offenses in the future, or by directly preventing further offenses by imprisonment, 
deportation, or execution, the good that comes out of punishment may outweigh (so the utilitarian 
argues) the intrinsic evil of suffering deliberately inflicted.”). 
 30. According to Professor Michael T. Cahill, rehabilitation “aims to transform those who were 
formerly motivated to commit crimes into law-abiding citizens.” Cahill, supra note 29, at 8. 
Therapeutic rehabilitation, one of several models of rehabilitation, posits that crime often results from 
pathologies that can be diagnosed and ameliorated through treatment. See infra notes 41–44. While 
mental health courts consider a criminal act to be a necessary predicate for State intervention, in 
principle rehabilitative efforts could be applied to individuals suspected of posing social risk before 
they commit a crime. See Cahill, supra note 29, at 8. 
 31. See infra notes 54–55. 
 32. See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler ed., 1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).  
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being of offenders and other legal actors.
33
 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
proposes that, other things being equal, the law should be restructured to 
accomplish therapeutic goals.
34
 Therapeutic jurisprudents point to the 
antitherapeutic effects of mandatory incarceration
35
 and assume that the 
coercive provision of mental health treatment will have a positive 
therapeutic impact on participants by addressing the source of their 
underlying criminal problem.
36
  
In addition, a few mental health court judges have suggested a second 
possible theory—a form of therapeutic or medical rehabilitation—as 
animating their courts.
37
 Therapeutic rehabilitation, which gained 
prominence in the mid-twentieth century through the writings of Karl 
Menninger,
38
 Benjamin Karpman,
39
 and others,
40
 is based on a medical 
 
 
 33. See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 196 (1995).  
 34. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 184, 198 (1997). 
 35. See David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
in Criminal Law Education, Research, and Practice, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS 11, 15 (David B. 
Wexler ed. 2008) (characterizing “a rigid, inflexible sentencing scheme, especially one characterized 
by mandatory incarcerative penalties” as antitherapeutic). 
 36. See RICHARD D. SCHNEIDER ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: DECRIMINALIZING THE 
MENTALLY ILL 49–50 (2007); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving 
Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1064–65 (2003).  
 37. See, e.g., Jeff Lehr, First Defendant Accepted at Local Mental Health Court, JOPLIN GLOBE, 
Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x435293406/First-defendant-accepted-at-local-mental 
-health-court (explaining that the goal of the mental health court “is to reduce the likelihood that such 
defendants will commit another crime by seeing that they get the mental health treatment they need”); 
Rob Perez, Fiscal Crisis Threatens Special Courts, HONOLULU ADVISOR, Feb. 22, 2010, Section 
News, available at 2010 WLNR 3788360 (“The idea behind the courts is that if the underlying 
problems contributing to the person’s troubles aren’t addressed, the person is likely to offend again 
and pass such behavior on to the next generation. . . . The main difference between Mental Health and 
regular court . . . was that the latter didn’t address the causes of [a participant’s] behavior problems.”); 
Will County Launches Mental Health Court, MORRIS DAILY HERALD, May 1, 2010, http://www. 
morrisdailyherald.com/articles/2010/04/30/48631081/index.xml (quoting Chief Judge Gerald Kinney 
as stating: “[The Mental Health Court] allows us to identify and treat individuals whose primary 
causes of being within the criminal justice system are their mental health issues. We can identify 
resources that will assist them and keep them from re-offending.”); see also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 48–50, 60 (conceptualizing therapeutic jurisprudence as a stand-alone theory of crime that 
encourages identification of the roots of criminality and the creation of a therapeutic response tailored 
to addressing and eliminating those criminal roots). 
 38. See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); Karl Menninger, 
Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE SCI. 367 (1928); Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION, supra note 19, at 132. 
 39. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES (1954); 
BENJAMIN KARPMAN, CASE STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME (1947); Benjamin 
Karpman, Criminal Psychodyamics: A Platform, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 
19, at 118.  
 40. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL Law (1963) (arguing that the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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model of crime.
41
 According to this theory, criminal behavior is 
symptomatic of mental illness or personality disorder.
42
 In essence, 
offenders are considered “sick” and in need of a state-coerced “cure” to 
address their underlying sources of criminality.
43
 Therapeutic 
rehabilitation holds that treatment—not traditional sentencing or 
incarceration—is necessary to transform criminals, whose acts are the 
product of pathology, into law-abiding individuals.
44
  
Mental health court proponents appear to embrace a brand of 
therapeutic rehabilitation based on two propositions. First, mental health 
courts justify segregating and diverting individuals with mental illnesses 
from the traditional justice system on the basis that their illnesses likely 
contributed to their criminal behavior. Second, and relatedly, mental health 
courts operate under the assumption that the amelioration of mental illness 
symptoms will reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior. In other 
words, by treating individuals’ mental illnesses, mental health courts will 
rehabilitate offenders into law-abiding citizens. 
This Article examines the theories of therapeutic jurisprudence and 
therapeutic rehabilitation and ultimately finds both unavailing for a 
substantial proportion of the offenders diverted into mental health courts. 
A careful review of the definition of therapeutic jurisprudence reveals that 
the structure and aim of this discipline preclude its use as a justification for 
mental health courts. The creators of therapeutic jurisprudence have 
consistently stressed that health is not a transcendent norm, and, in the 
face of significant normative conflict, therapeutic jurisprudence does not 
provide a means to mediate between competing values.
45
 Because mental 
health courts express values that conflict substantially with those endorsed 
by the traditional criminal justice system, therapeutic jurisprudence is 
inadequate to justify the existence of mental health courts. 
 
 
criminal justice system should serve preventative, not punitive, ends and treat the origins of 
criminality). 
 41. For a description of the tenets and evolution of therapeutic rehabilitation, see EDGARDO 
ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 
60–63 (1990). Most of the criticism of rehabilitation in the 1970s was aimed at the therapeutic model 
of rehabilitation. Id. at 5.  
 42. See Murphy, supra note 19, at 5; Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform, supra 
note 39, at 119 (arguing that “criminality is but a symptom of insanity”). 
 43. See ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 5.  
 44. See WOOTTON, supra note 40, at 77, 79; Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform, 
supra note 39, at 128, 131. 
 45. See Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 191, 198; 
David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Mental Health 
Law, in HANDBOOK PSYCHOL. & L. 361, 373 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992). 
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Moreover, the penal theory of therapeutic rehabilitation—at least as 
envisioned by mental health court advocates—is largely unavailable as a 
justification for mental health courts because the factual assumptions 
underlying this theory are belied by scientific evidence. As Professor 
Stephen J. Morse has argued for decades,
46
 social and psychological 
research demonstrates that the criminal acts of individuals with mental 
illnesses often do not stem from their disorders but may arise from a 
number of motivations.
47
 Since many mental health courts do not require a 
demonstrated nexus between an individual’s mental illness and his 
criminal offense,
48
 courts’ assumption of a causal link appears misplaced. 
In addition, the weight of recent scientific evidence demonstrates that 
mental illness is not a direct contributor to recidivism for most offenders 
with mental illnesses.
49
 Instead, such offenders often simply exhibit the 
same risk factors—such as substance abuse, family problems, and 
antisocial tendencies—as other offenders.50 It is these risk factors, not 
symptomatic mental illness, that directly contribute to criminal activity for 
a majority of individuals with mental illnesses.  
These two assertions—that crimes are often not the product of mental 
illness, and that mental illness is usually not a significant contributor to 
recidivism—might strike some readers as counterintuitive. Indeed, perhaps 
in part due to the relentless portrayal of individuals with mental illnesses 
as dangerous and impulsive by the media,
51
 many of us believe in a strong, 
causal relationship between mental illness and violent or criminal 
behavior.
52
 Even some advocates of individuals with mental illnesses 
 
 
 46. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 210, 211, 
216 (1999); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health 
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 564–90 (1978). 
 47. See infra notes 217–30 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra notes 201–13 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra notes 291–99 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., OTTO F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC IMAGES OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1995); 
George Gerbner et al., Health and Medicine on Television, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 901 (1981); John 
Monahan, “A Terror to Their Neighbors”: Beliefs About Mental Disorder and Violence in Historical 
and Cultural Perspective, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 192 (1992) (describing results of 
studies of media images of individuals with mental illnesses); Nancy Signorielli, The Stigma of Mental 
Illness on Television, 33 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 325 (1989). 
 52. See, e.g., Andrew B. Borinstein, Public Attitudes Toward Persons with Mental Illness, 11 
HEALTH AFFS. 186 (1993) (reporting results from a 1989 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Program 
on Chronic Mental Illness study finding that 15 to 24 percent of respondents were concerned about the 
potential violence and dangerousness of persons with mental illness); Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 805, 808 (1993) (“[W]e often presume that all mentally disabled individuals are dangerous 
by virtue of their mentally ill status, regardless of their actual condition and despite the fact that few of 
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assume their criminal acts are often symptomatic of their disorders.
53
 
Decades of social science research, however, demonstrate that this belief 
may be fueled more by stigma and stereotype than by reality.  
This Article is organized in the following manner. Part I defines 
therapeutic jurisprudence and explores its normative potential. It 
concludes by listing sources of normative conflict between the values 
expressed by mental health courts and those of retribution and deterrence, 
two theories of punishment that predominate in the traditional justice 
system. Part II investigates the potential of therapeutic rehabilitation to 
justify the existence of mental health courts. It defines therapeutic 
rehabilitation and identifies the central empirical assumptions of this 
theory in the context of mental health courts. The Article next draws on 
social science research to investigate the relationship between mental 
illness and crime and suggests that, to the extent mental health courts 
purport to target individuals whose crimes and recidivistic tendencies stem 
from their mental illnesses, mental health courts are currently 
overinclusive. The Article concludes by suggesting other theories of 
punishment or social welfare that potentially justify the existence of these 
specialty courts.  
I. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Many mental health court judges, including the judge who founded one 
of the earliest and most widely emulated courts in Broward County, 
Florida, in 1997,
54
 claim that therapeutic jurisprudence provides 
 
 
them are actually dangerous.”); Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Evidence Bearing on Mental Illness as a 
Possible Cause of Violent Behavior, 17 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 172 (1995) (finding that symptoms of 
mental illness are strongly connected with fear of potential violence); Monahan, supra note 51 
(demonstrating that the belief that mental disorder is moderately associated with violence is 
historically invariant and culturally universal); Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 
394–97 (1992) (discussing common societal myths held by the public and legal actors regarding 
mentally disabled individuals, including the myth that they are dangerous and frightening); Jo C. 
Phelan et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness in 1950 and 1996: What Is Mental Illness and Is It 
to Be Feared?, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 188 (2000) (finding a significant increase over time in 
the number of people describing individuals with mental illnesses as violent). 
 53. See infra note 183. 
 54. See Ginger Lerner-Wren, Broward’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach to the 
Mentally Disabled in the Criminal Justice System, FUTURE TRENDS ST. CTS. 3 (2000), available at 
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/spcts&CISOPTR=184&REC=1 
(articulating a central goal as applying “a therapeutic approach to the processing of offenders to better 
assist them and family in the recovery process and in assuming personal responsibility for their 
comprehensive health needs”); id. (identifying one critical feature of Broward’s mental health court as 
“wholly adopt[ing] and appl[ying] the principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence—a legal construct that 
advances the Courts’ role as an active therapeutic agent in the recovery process”). 
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theoretical grounding for the courts.
55
 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the law by recognizing that legal 
rules, legal procedures, and the approaches taken by legal actors serve as 
social forces that may produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic 
consequences.
56
 Professor David B. Wexler, a cofounder of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, has indicated that the definition suggested by Professor 
Christopher Slobogin best captures the appropriate scope of therapeutic 
jurisprudence: “the use of social science to study the extent to which a 
legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being 
of the people it affects.”57 Much of the value of therapeutic jurisprudence 
exists in its service as a “lens” that prompts observers to question the 
therapeutic effect of legal arrangements and outcomes.
58
 Recently, 
Professor Wexler has stressed that therapeutic jurisprudence “is not and 
has never pretended to be a full-blown ‘theory,’”59 but instead is “simply a 
‘field of inquiry’—in essence a research agenda—focusing attention on 
the often overlooked area of the impact of the law on psychological well-
being and the like.”60  
 
 
 55. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 36, at 39 (identifying therapeutic jurisprudence as 
having “formed the theoretical underpinning of mental health courts”); see also id. at 61 (describing 
mental health courts as a manifestation of therapeutic jurisprudence in the criminal justice system); 
Matthew J. D’Emic, The Promise of Mental Health Courts: Brooklyn Criminal Justice System 
Experiments with Treatment as an Alternative to Prison, 22 CRIM. JUST. 24, 25 (2007) (describing the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court as “the latest incarnation of ‘therapeutic’” courts); Anchorage 
Coordinated Resources Project, Anchorage Mental Health Court, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, http:// 
www.courts.alaska.gov/mhct.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (stating that the Anchorage Mental Health 
Court “is a voluntary ‘therapeutic’ or ‘problem-solving’ court . . . that hears cases involving 
individuals diagnosed with mental disabilities who are charged with misdemeanor offenses and 
focuses on their treatment and rehabilitation”). Commentators have also stressed the link between 
therapeutic jurisprudence and mental health courts. See, e.g., Faraci, supra note 21, at 816 (stating that 
mental health courts “employ a philosophy of therapeutic justice instead of punishment, deterrence and 
retribution.”); David Rottman & Pamela Casey, A New Role for Courts?, NAT’L INSTIT. JUST. J. 12, 15 
(July 1999) (suggesting that “therapeutic jurisprudence arguably provides the underlying legal theory” 
for problem-solving courts); Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Manager: 
A New Conception of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 125 (2007) (observing that “judges 
are using mental health courts as a jurisdictional grant of authority to implement therapeutic 
jurisprudence”).  
 56. Introduction, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY xvii, xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick 
eds., 1996). 
 57. David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 220, 223–24 (1995) (quoting Slobogin, supra note 33, at 196). 
 58. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 279, 280 (1993). 
 59. David B. Wexler, From Theory to Practice and Back Again in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Now Comes the Hard Part 1 (Ariz. Legal Stud., Discussion Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1580129. 
 60. Id. 
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One challenging aspect of therapeutic jurisprudence is its creators’ 
steadfast refusal to define “therapeutic” with precision.61 Encouraging 
“commentators to roam within the intuitive and common sense contours of 
the concept” to stimulate scholarly inquiry and debate,62 Professors 
Wexler and Winick have offered only the broadest guidance on what 
subjects may fall within the ambit of the term. Professor Winick, for 
instance, has suggested that anything that is “at least [in] some sense 
related to psychological functioning” could be characterized as 
therapeutic.
63
 Professors Winick and Wexler have acknowledged that one 
consequence of eschewing a stable definition is that opinions will diverge 
on what should count as therapeutic.
64
 Indeed, as Professor Slobogin has 
recognized, whether a legal rule, procedure, or approach is deemed 
therapeutic will likely vary according to the identity, ideology, interests, 
experience, values, and perspective of the evaluator.
65
  
Regardless of the definition one chooses to adopt, there is very little 
empirical evidence on the impact—therapeutic or otherwise—of mental 
health courts.
66
 Even if empirical testing were to demonstrate consistently 
that mental health courts are more therapeutic for offenders with mental 
illnesses than the traditional criminal justice system—whether 
“therapeutic” were defined as decreasing recidivism, improving rates of 
treatment compliance, enhancing mental functioning, or in any other 
manner—this finding alone would not suffice to justify the adoption or 
sustenance of a mental health court. To explain this conclusion, it is 
necessary to analyze the normative strength of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
 
 
 61. See Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 
48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 547–50 (2007) [hereinafter RSVP] (outlining criticisms of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, including ambiguities in terminology, and the responses of Professors Wexler and 
Winick). 
 62. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 57, at 221. 
 63. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 194; see also 
Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 57, at 223 (suggesting that 
“[a] focus on the mental health and psychological aspects of health [is probably] most appropriate, 
recognizing that even this is (and should remain) very rough around the edges.”). 
 64. See Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 57, at 222 
(“For example, is rehabilitation defined by attitudinal changes or by the absence of criminal activity 
(itself measured by self-reports or by official records)? Should one care about achieving rehabilitation 
if it is manifested only by attitudinal change? Why or why not? How is emotional stress to be 
measured? Should one be concerned with the law’s impact on emotional stress in the short-term, in the 
long-term, or both?”); Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 195. 
 65. See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 204, 206–07 (describing how two scholars analyzing the 
impact of the adversarial process in the civil commitment context reached diametrically opposed 
conclusions based, apparently, on their different experiences, training, and education). 
 66. See supra notes 10–16.  
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A. Normative Content of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is normative in orientation.
67
 Professor 
Wexler has conceded that “[t]he normative side of [therapeutic 
jurisprudence] is still being worked out,”68 but the discipline certainly has 
a “soft normative element”69 in that it is designed to inspire scholarship 
that may be useful for legal reform.
70
 As explained by Professor Winick:  
Therapeutic jurisprudence’s basic insight was that scholars should 
study [certain] consequences and reshape and redesign law in order 
to accomplish two goals—too [sic] minimize antitherapeutic effects, 
and[,] when it is consistent with other legal goals, to increase law’s 
therapeutic potential. Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence is an 
interdisciplinary approach to legal scholarship that has a law reform 
agenda.
71
 
In essence, therapeutic jurisprudence calls for an exploration of the 
psychological, physical, and emotional consequences of the law and 
proposes that research results should factor into policy discussions 
underlying legal reform efforts.
72
  
A key tenet of therapeutic jurisprudence is that a determination of 
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences is predictably suggestive of 
legal reform only when normative values do not conflict.
73
 When the 
 
 
 67. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 188. 
 68. Wexler, From Theory to Practice, supra note 59, at 1 n.4. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 185. Some 
judges and commentators have suggested that therapeutic jurisprudence employs a stable definition of 
“therapeutic” and has a stronger, consistent normative message in the context of problem-solving 
courts. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 36, at 39–66. This normative vision largely reduces to an 
endorsement of therapeutic rehabilitation when applied to offenders with mental illnesses. See id. at 47 
(“[T]herapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, for accused with mental disorders, minor criminal acts in 
appropriate circumstances may more realistically be the manifestations of an untreated psychiatric 
illness and crumbling mental healthcare system.”); id. at 48 (articulating a “first principle” of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as the idea that “pursuing therapeutic outcomes is an appropriate response to 
the causes of the ‘crime’ for some mentally disordered accused”). I address the potential of therapeutic 
rehabilitation to justify mental health courts in the next Part. 
 71. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, supra note 36, at 1063. 
 72. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to 
Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 1004 (1991); see also 
Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 188 (observing that 
“[a]ccomplishing positive therapeutic consequences or eliminating or minimizing antitherapeutic 
consequences . . . emerges as an important objective in any sensible law reform effort.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach, supra note 72, 
at 984 (“If the therapeutically appropriate legal arrangements are not normatively objectionable on 
other grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform.”); Winick, The 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 533 
 
 
 
 
adoption of a therapeutic legal approach would conflict to a significant 
extent with other legal norms,
74
 therapeutic jurisprudence does not provide 
a way to resolve the conflict.
75
 Consistently, Professors Wexler and 
Winick have emphasized that psychological and physical health are not 
transcendent norms
76
 and that therapeutic jurisprudence “in no way 
suggests that therapeutic considerations should trump other concerns.”77 
Professor Winick has observed that 
although, in general, positive therapeutic consequences should be 
valued and antitherapeutic consequences should be avoided, there 
are other consequences that should count, and sometimes count 
more. There are many instances in which a particular law or legal 
practice may produce antitherapeutic effects, but nonetheless may 
be justified by considerations of justice or by the desire to achieve 
various constitutional, economic, environmental, or other normative 
goals.
78
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence offers no opinion—in general or in specific 
instances—as to whether therapeutic considerations should be valued 
more heavily than autonomy, fairness, accuracy, consistency, perceived 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, public safety, or a host of other 
values.
79
  
In addition to suggesting legal reform when normative values 
converge, “[t]herapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other things being 
equal, the law should be restructured to better accomplish therapeutic 
 
 
Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 191 (“Although therapeutic 
jurisprudence suggests that law should be used to promote mental health and psychological 
functioning, it does not suggest that psychological and physical health is a transcending norm. It 
suggests that law reform should be informed by this value, but only when otherwise normatively 
unobjectionable.”). But see Quinn, RSVP, supra note 61, at 552–53 (observing that, despite apparent 
tension between therapeutic and other norms, Professor Wexler has urged criminal defense attorneys 
to adopt proposed “best practices” to permit greater therapeutic possibilities). 
 74. At times, Professors Wexler and Winick have suggested that therapeutic values may control 
when they “strongly” outweigh competing considerations. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Applying the 
Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 79 (2000). It is unclear how, 
if at all, therapeutic jurisprudence assists in the weighing of competing values. 
 75. See, e.g., Wexler & Schopp, supra note 45, at 373 (“As a research program, therapeutic 
jurisprudence does not resolve conflicts among competing values.”); Winick, The Jurisprudence of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 198 (“Although therapeutic jurisprudence is premised on 
the notion that, other things being equal, health is a value that law should seek to foster, it makes no 
attempt to assign relative values to the various other goals of law.”).  
 76. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 191. 
 77. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, supra note 58, at 280. 
 78. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 191. 
 79. See Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, supra note 58, at 280; 
David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 20–21 (2008).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
534 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:519 
 
 
 
 
goals.”80 Professor Wexler has acknowledged that identifying when 
nontherapeutic values stand in equipoise will be difficult and often 
contestable and that therapeutic jurisprudence is not equipped to resolve 
this debate.
81
 Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes the value of 
physiological, physical, and emotional consequences but does not 
comment on the relative value of other legal goals or effects.
82
 Critics have 
observed that, without articulating rules for determining when other values 
are equal, therapeutic jurisprudence may promote therapeutic values in 
ways that appear arbitrary.
83
 
When therapeutic considerations exist in tension with other criminal 
justice norms, scholars and policy makers must appeal to an overarching 
normative framework to resolve the conflict.
84
 The particular ethical or 
political theory should assign relative weights to the conflicting values.
85
 
As normative agreement in criminal law and procedure is elusive, so too 
will be consensus on how therapeutic considerations should be weighed 
against values of autonomy, fairness, accuracy, consistency, and 
legitimacy.
86
 Recognizing this limitation, scholars have urged proponents 
 
 
 80. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, supra note 58, at 280 
(emphasis added); see also Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 
188 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other things being equal, positive therapeutic effects 
are desirable and should generally be a proper aim of law, and that antitherapeutic effects are 
undesirable and should be avoided or minimized.” (emphasis in original)). 
 81. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, supra note 58, at 280; see also 
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental Health 
Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225, 226 (1992). 
 82. See Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 198 
(“Although therapeutic jurisprudence is premised on the notion that, other things being equal, health is 
a value that law should seek to foster, it makes no attempt to assign relative values to the various other 
goals of law.”). 
 83. See John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 877, 890 (1993) (reviewing ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1992)).  
 84. See Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach, supra note 72, at 983 
(specifying that “[t]he premise that a rule or practice is antitherapeutic . . . does not support the 
conclusion that the rule should be changed in the absence of a shared, although perhaps unarticulated, 
normative major premise.”). 
 85. See Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 198 
(“Resolution of this conflict would require use of an overarching theory of value that would assign 
weights to the various values in question. . . . To resolve such conflicts of value, one must go outside 
therapeutic jurisprudence to some ethical or political theory that establishes a hierarchy of values.”). 
 86. See Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach, supra note 72, at 985 
(“It may be difficult to reach agreement on standards for conducting such a comparison of perhaps 
conflicting therapeutic consequences; this essentially involves the sharing of normative premises about 
which there may be no consensus.”). Ken Kress offers this observation and thoroughly explores its 
implications in Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Resolution of Value Conflicts: What We Can 
Realistically Expect, in Practice, from Theory, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 555 (1999). 
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of “therapeutic” policy proposals to specify their normative assumptions, 
thus allowing for examination and critique.
87
 
It is worth emphasizing that the inability of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
resolve significant normative conflict does not deprive it of value or 
consequence. Therapeutic jurisprudence illuminates an important category 
of legal effects that has been largely neglected.
88
 An understanding of the 
psychological, physical, and emotional effects of legal approaches 
certainly should inform the normative dispute regarding the ordering of 
competing values and contribute to the precise weighing of legal 
alternatives.
89
 While therapeutic jurisprudence does not resolve a debate 
among values, it does sharpen the inputs and enrich the discussion.
90
 
B. Normative Conflict Between Mental Health Courts and the Traditional 
Criminal Justice System 
Ultimately, therapeutic jurisprudence is unable to justify the existence 
of mental health courts because the decision to create and sustain a mental 
health court is not free of significant normative conflict. Increasingly, 
scholarship seeking to justify the imposition of punishment blurs the 
boundaries between retributivism
91
 and utilitarianism,
92
 and many modern 
thinkers recognize that a mix of retributive and preventative considerations 
should guide sentencing in the criminal justice system.
93
 While 
rehabilitating offenders remains an important goal of many sentencing and 
punishment schemes,
94
 retribution and deterrence, along with 
 
 
 87. See Kress, supra note 86, at 562; Petrila, supra note 83, at 889 n.35 (stating, after discussing 
the failure to articulate competing norms and values with precision, that “the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles appears somewhat arbitrary and dependent on the subjective preferences of 
people writing about it.”); Slobogin, supra note 33, at 210–18 (exploring the difficulty of the internal 
and external balancing of competing norms called for by therapeutic jurisprudence). 
 88. See David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125, 
125 (2000); Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach, supra note 72, at 983. 
 89. See Wexler & Schopp, supra note 45, at 373 (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence “seeks 
information needed to promote certain goals and to inform the normative dispute regarding the 
legitimacy or priority of competing values”); Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 191 (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence calls for an awareness of 
therapeutic considerations and “enables a more precise weighing of sometimes competing values.”). 
 90. See Kress, supra note 86, at 557 (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence may “change one’s 
view of the import, recommendation, or weight of some value”); Winick, The Jurisprudence of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 34, at 206 (“When therapeutic and other normative values 
conflict, the conflict sharpens the debate, but does not resolve it.”); id. at 195 (“Therapeutic 
jurisprudence cannot resolve this debate but can enrich the decision-making process.”). 
 91. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
 92. For a brief discussion of utilitarianism, see supra note 29. 
 93. See Cahill, supra note 29. 
 94. Many commentators have recognized that problem-solving courts demonstrate a resurgence 
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incapacitation, are generally considered the dominant goals of the modern 
penal system.
95
 The goals, values, and communicative message of mental 
health courts, largely consistent with a theory of rehabilitation, stand in 
sharp contrast to those espoused by retributive and deterrence theories of 
punishment.
96
 In particular, mental health courts’ singular concern with 
treatment, as opposed to blame, may violate retributivism’s cornerstone 
principles of proportionality and just deserts, convey harmful and 
stigmatizing messages about offenders, and trivialize underlying criminal 
acts. Mental health courts may also undermine goals of specific and 
general deterrence by offering scarce social goods to court participants, 
thus potentially incentivizing individuals to commit crimes in order to 
receive these goods.  
 
 
of rehabilitation. See Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
951 (2006); infra notes 150–53. In addition, rehabilitation, along with retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation, remains an objective of the federal sentencing guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) (2004) (directing a judge to consider the need for a sentence “to provide the defendant 
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner”). 
 95. See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 329 
(2004) (“[T]he intended purpose for incarceration has evolved in the last thirty years from one 
predominantly of rehabilitation to a mixture of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.”); Amy 
Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2010). Exploring 
the relationship between mental health courts and the penal goal of incapacitation is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 96. Many of the concerns delineated in this section were voiced during the mid- to late-twentieth 
century as part of the critique of the rehabilitative theory of punishment, which was then dominant. 
See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 32–59 (1981) (presenting 
three criticisms of rehabilitation: its constitution as a threat to liberal political values, its vulnerability 
to debasement, and its lack of technique or effectiveness); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that individualized and indeterminate sentencing is 
inequitable, discriminatory, and paternalistic); Andrew von Hirsch, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS 9–34 (1986) (criticizing the viewpoint that rehabilitation should guide the choice of 
criminal disposition, that the disposition should vary by the offender’s likelihood of reoffending, and 
that officials should possess wide discretion to tailor the disposition to the needs of the individual 
offender); C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 3 20TH CENTURY 5 (1948–49), in 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301, 302 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971) (“[W]hen we cease to consider what 
the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed 
him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere 
object, a patient, a ‘case.’”). For a thorough catalogue of the criticisms levied against rehabilitation, 
see ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 101–33, and Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug 
Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1223–45 (1998) (applying these critiques to 
drug treatment courts). 
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1. Ignoring Proportionality and Just Deserts 
Retributivism, the oldest and most popular justification of 
punishment,
97
 defies easy definition.
98
 One strand of retributivism 
theorizes that deserved punishment, justified by the moral culpability and 
desert of the offender, is an intrinsic good.
99
 Retributivists, in general, 
believe that punishment is just so long as it is proportionate to the moral 
culpability of the offender and the wrong he committed.
100
 In essence, 
punishment is an act of reciprocity: the state exacts from the offender the 
measure exacted by his wrongful act.
101
 Immanuel Kant argued that 
offenders’ punishment must match—in kind and degree—the suffering or 
deprivation endured by their victims,
102
 but modern retributivists accept 
“rough” proportionality between penalties for separate crimes.103  
Mental health courts embrace a contrary and antagonistic purpose. As 
discussed below, mental health courts, while not finding eligible offenders 
 
 
 97. See Paul Butler, Retribution, For Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV 1873, 1874 (1999); Leigh 
Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There Justice for Battered Women Who Kill?, 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 269, 288 (2007).  
 98. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (delineating nine 
distinct retributivist theories). For recent scholarship complicating the dominant understanding of 
retributivism and challenging the strict divide between retributivist and consequentialist theories of 
punishment, see Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 433 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
 99. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 127 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. 
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (“[T]he universal feeling of peoples and 
individuals towards crime is, and always has been, that it deserves to be punished, and that what the 
criminal has done should also happen to him.”) (emphasis in original); Michael Moore, The Moral 
Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability 
of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.”).  
 While traditional retributivism holds that proportionate punishment is an intrinsic good, some 
retributivists (in particular, those arguing that retributive punishment promotes crime control or 
provides pleasure or utility) may view retributive punishment as an instrumental good. See Cahill, 
supra note 29, at 4–5; see also Berman, supra note 98 (arguing that retributivism may be viewed as a 
subtype of instrumentalist justifications for punishment).  
 100. Butler, supra note 97, at 188 (“Retribution measures just punishment by considering whether 
there is proportionality between crime and punishment.”).  
 101. See HEGEL, supra note 99, at 127; IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 70 
(1989) (“Retribution is an act of reciprocity, and thus something that the person on whom it is inflicted 
has deserved; therefore, it is just, justified, legitimate.”). 
 102. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans., Hackett 
Pub. Co. 2d. ed. 1999) (1797) (discussing the principle of punishment in proportion to the wrong 
committed and arguing, “If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from 
yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.”).  
 103. See H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968) (“[M]odern retributive 
theory is concerned with proportionality. . . . [I]t is concerned with the relationships within a system of 
punishment between penalties for different crimes, and not with the relationship between particular 
crimes and particular offences.”). 
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“insane” and thus excused under criminal law,104 attribute their criminal 
acts to their mental illnesses and society’s failure to provide adequate 
community mental healthcare.
105
 This causal ascription creates a belief 
that eligible offenders are less culpable for their acts than nondisordered 
offenders and that traditional punishment is thus inappropriate.
106
 Instead, 
court-ordered treatment is considered the morally fitting—and, in the 
parlance of retribution, the “roughly proportionate”—response of the state 
to the wrongful acts of offenders with mental illnesses.
107
  
Critically, mental health courts’ decisions about whom to accept for 
rehabilitation may not involve a rigorous inquiry into the connection 
between a potential participant’s mental illness and his criminal 
behavior.
108
 As discussed in Part II, many courts appear not to require, for 
purposes of eligibility, any determination that mental illness contributed to 
an underlying criminal act.
109
 Instead, many eligibility decisions appear to 
rest upon an assumption that offenders with certain mental illnesses as a 
 
 
 104. Because of the narrow way in which “insanity” is defined in federal and state criminal codes, 
only a small subset of defendants with mental illnesses raise an insanity defense and are found insane, 
and thus excused, under criminal law. See, e.g., Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the 
Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/ 
Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. REV. 447 (2004) (analyzing various constructions of insanity 
defenses and the problems with punishing mentally ill offenders); Julie E. Grachek, Note, The Insanity 
Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can 
Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1481 (2006) (“Mental illness itself does not preclude criminal 
responsibility. In order to successfully plead the insanity defense, a defendant must not only show that 
he is mentally ill, but must also show that there was a nexus connecting the mental illness and the 
criminal offense at issue.”); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 68–69 (1994) (referencing “mad and bad” defendants unable to succeed with a 
nonresponsibility defense who are subsequently imprisoned); Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence 
to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2006) 
(providing an example of an individual “whose mental illness prevents comprehension of reality” as a 
person who has no level of intention under the criminal law, thus meriting treatment, not punishment).  
 105. See infra notes 178, 179–83, 242–49 and accompanying text. 
 106. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 36, at 3, 45, 62–63, 153–54. 
 107. See id. at 62–63, 153–55. But see John A. Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”: Legal 
Implications of the New Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 78–81 (2002) 
[hereinafter “The Devil Made Me Do It”] (taking the position that proportionality is not a sentencing 
consideration under a regime prioritizing treatment). Individuals eligible for participation in mental 
health courts may already be receiving mental health services. For these individuals, diversion to 
treatment constitutes an illogical response to a criminal offense. I am grateful to Professor Nancy 
Wolff for sharing this observation. 
 108. For the most in-depth analysis of mental health courts’ selection and admission processes to 
date, see Nancy Wolff et al., Mental Health Courts and Their Selection Processes: Modeling Variation 
for Consistency, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 402 (2011) (describing a variable decisionmaking process 
that typically consists of three eligibility screening stages). This qualitative study of six mental health 
courts revealed that some, but not all, courts required a strong connection between a participant’s 
mental illness and his criminal behavior. See id. at 408, app. 
 109. See infra notes 199–213 and accompanying text. 
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group are less blameworthy than other criminals because such individuals 
do not consciously choose to commit crimes.
110
 This assumption derives 
from outdated and discredited stereotypes about the capacities and 
motivations of individuals with mental illnesses and violates principles of 
just deserts and proportionality.
111
 This concern may be less acute for 
mental health courts that require guilty pleas prior to admission.
112
 
2. Portraying Offenders as Lacking Autonomy and Moral Agency  
Another divergence between mental health courts and the traditional 
criminal justice system is the message communicated to the public about 
offenders. Retributive and deterrence theories of punishment treat 
offenders as moral agents who should be held accountable for their 
conduct.
113
 G. W. F. Hegel, for instance, has argued that, as rational 
beings, criminals choose to commit acts to which punishments attach, and 
thus have a right to experience those punishments.
114
 Similarly, theories of 
deterrence rest on the belief that individuals are rational, self-interested 
beings capable of assessing an action’s likely impact and conforming their 
behavior to the results of this cost-benefit analysis.
115
 The traditional 
 
 
 110. See, e.g., Malcomb Daniels, Mental Health Court Plans Unveiled Today, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, May 12, 2010, at 1 (quoting Probate Judge Jim Fuhrmeister as stating: “For the people who are 
going to be treated in mental health court, jail is not the answer. . . . The root of their problem is mental 
illness.”); David J. Hill, City Court Expands, TONAWANDA NEWS, Apr. 27, 2010, http://tonawanda-
news.com/local/x993514904/City-court-expands (quoting Judge Joseph J. Cassata as stating: “We are 
finding that more and more people who enter the criminal justice system enter it because of a mental 
health condition.”); Mental Health Court Gains Support, TENNESSEAN, June 4, 2007, at B1 (“[Judge] 
Brandon, likely to preside over the mental health court, said when a person’s mental illness leads to 
crime, the illness needs to be dealt with.”); see also Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra note 
20, at 432 (observing that “[m]ental health courts assume uncritically that criminal behavior is caused 
by a psychiatric problem”); infra notes 179–83. 
 111. Studies reveal that, like other individuals who commit crimes, offenders with mental illnesses 
are motivated by a host of goals and impacted by a number of external factors. See infra notes 217–33 
and accompanying text.  
 112. Some mental health courts require that participants enter guilty pleas prior to admittance to 
the court. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 13 (listing studies demonstrating that mental health 
courts that accept felons typically require guilty pleas); Redlich et al., Second Generation, supra note 
4, at 534–35. In these instances, punishment is suspended until and unless the defendant fails to 
comply with a treatment directive.  
 113. See generally Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Introduction, in THE REASONING 
CRIMINAL 1–16 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986) (deterrence); Dan Markel, What 
Might Retributive Justice Be? An Argument for the Confrontational Conception of Retributivism, in 
RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 104 (Mark D. White, ed., 2001) (retributivism). 
 114. See HEGEL, supra note 99, at 126. 
 115. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (C. K. Ogden ed., Richard 
Hildreth trans., 1931) (1802) (“[T]o prevent an offense, it is necessary that the repressive motive 
should be stronger than the seductive motive. The punishment must be more an object of dread than 
the offense is an object of desire.”). Indeed, law and economics scholars have recognized that 
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justice system assumes that all individuals—unless adjudged insane or 
incompetent—understand the difference between right and wrong, or at 
least are capable of differentiating between those actions that society 
deems acceptable and unacceptable.
116
 In essence, society assumes that an 
individual’s offense reflects his choice to engage in criminal activity. 
When circumstances reveal that a criminal act was not the product of an 
offender’s choice, he generally will not suffer punishment. The menagerie 
of excuses and justifications in criminal law—ranging from insanity to 
duress to accident—reflects this preoccupation with choice.117 Thus, our 
traditional criminal justice system conveys a message of respect for the 
autonomy and choices of offenders. 
The predominant message expressed by mental health courts, on the 
other hand, is that offenders with mental illnesses—who, to be clear, have 
not been found “insane” under criminal law118—so lack autonomy and 
moral agency that they are inappropriate subjects for the traditional 
criminal justice system.
119
 Mental health courts convey at least three 
overlapping impressions about offenders with mental illnesses that act 
synergistically to deepen and reinforce the stigma and isolation associated 
with mental illness. First, the existence of mental health courts 
communicates that, unlike other offenders and because of their mental 
illnesses, offenders with mental illnesses lack autonomy, rationality, self-
determination, and the ability to control their behavior. Offenders with 
mental illnesses, as a class, are therefore not considered to be truly 
responsible for their actions or proper subjects for typical punishment.
120
 
 
 
deterrence theory manifests the economic theory of rational choice. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172–76 (1968). 
 116. See Excerpts from the Reference Manual, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 140, 
140 (2007) (noting that, in most jurisdictions, competency is determined by whether defendants know 
the difference between right from wrong, or understand the wrongfulness of their behavior). 
 117. See Adam Candeub, An Economic Theory of Criminal Excuse, 50 B.C. L. REV. 87, 89 (2009) 
(“‘All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the 
punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want 
or defect of will.’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 17 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish 2001) (1765))).  
 118. See supra note 104. 
 119. For a careful exposition of the role that a similar argument played in the liberal critique of the 
rehabilitative ideal of the early to mid-twentieth century, see Boldt, supra note 96, at 1241–42. 
 120. See Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra note 20, at 434 (“The therapeutic message 
that goes along with mental health courts is that bad behavior is the fault of the illness, that the illness 
is in control of the behavior, and that the individual cannot and should not be held responsible for such 
deviance.”); id. (observing that “this type of special status for offenders who have mental illness holds 
the illness responsible for the behavior, not the individual and, as such, opens the opportunity for 
individuals to use illness to excuse behavior”); see also Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”, supra 
note 107, at 72 (“Fully embracing a correctional response calculated to address individual deficiencies 
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Studies have shown that mental illnesses typically do not cause individuals 
to commit crimes, however,
121
 which explains why our justice system only 
permits mental illness to serve as an excuse for criminal behavior in 
limited circumstances.  
Second, the very existence of mental health courts conveys that mental 
illness represents a particularly dire source of recidivism that warrants 
both isolation and an influx of resources to combat.
122
 Unlike other 
problem-solving courts such as drug treatment courts,
123
 prostitution 
courts, and domestic violence courts, mental health courts do not focus on 
a particular form of crime. Instead, mental health courts extract from the 
stream of general offenders individuals whose only commonality is that 
they share a particular characteristic—mental illness.124 In essence, as 
Professor Nancy Wolff has observed, the title “mental health courts”—in 
calling attention to the condition of mental illness rather than a particular 
category of crime—implies that mental illness itself is criminal.125 
Stressing the (assumed and inaccurate) link between mental illness and 
crime traps these offenders within their illnesses and deepens the stigma 
and isolation associated with their condition.
126
 Thus, mental health courts 
 
 
leading to criminal conduct will directly challenge the view of the human species as ‘autonomous,’ 
worthy of blame for the bad, and deserving of credit for the good.”).  
 As noted earlier, some mental health courts require defendants to plead guilty prior to admission 
to the court. See supra note 112. In these circumstances, offenders with mental illnesses are held 
responsible for their acts. However, a guilty plea may be expunged in some jurisdictions pending 
successful completion of the treatment program. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 13. 
 121. See, e.g., James Bonta, Moira Law & Karl Hanson, The Prediction of Criminal and Violent 
Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 135–
36 (1998) (finding that most clinical factors, such as diagnosis and treatment history, have little 
relevance to the assessment of risk for recidivism); Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 
115–17 (summarizing bodies of evidence establishing that “major predictors of violence and 
recidivism are not unique to offenders with mental illness, but instead shared with general offenders”); 
infra notes 217, 233, 274–80, 291–99. 
 122. See Quinn, RSVP, supra note 61, at 569 (observing that that the therapeutic jurisprudence 
model, “with its emphasis on rehabilitation and transforming clients’ lives, is laden with assumptions 
about the criminal defense client population—not the least of which is that they are guilty, likely to 
offend again, and in need of transformation”). 
 123. Some drug courts do not focus exclusively on drug crimes. I am grateful to Professor Mae 
Quinn for this insight. 
 124. Other specialty courts may share this defining characteristic, such as veterans’ courts, 
homelessness courts, and fathering courts.  
 125. Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra note 20, at 434 (“Furthermore, labeling the court 
a ‘mental health’ court, focuses public attention on psychiatric issues, and amplifies the mark 
associated with the court. It is interesting to note that other specialized courts are named after the 
related offending behavior—for example, drug courts or domestic abuse courts. The label mental 
health court implicitly equates mental health with a criminal offense.”). 
 126. See id. (“By their existence and behavior, these specialized courts trap persons in their 
illnesses, distinguish them from ‘normal’ citizens, and return them to a therapeutic state.”); id. (“In 
addition, identifying people by their illnesses is known to mark them in ways that can be shaming. 
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may offer the worst of both worlds—suggesting that offenders with mental 
illnesses lack autonomy while also imposing the stigma of criminality.
127
 
Third, mental health courts convey that, left to their own devices, 
offenders with mental illnesses cannot be trusted to make responsible 
healthcare decisions, even when supplied with treatment options at public 
expense.
128
 This sentiment is reinforced by those commentators and judges 
who blame these offenders’ acts on their unwillingness to recognize their 
mental illnesses or their failure to take medication.
129
 Instead of allowing 
offenders with mental illnesses to select among treatment options 
(including the option of foregoing certain types of treatment deemed to 
carry intolerable side effects or to be too invasive), mental health courts 
employ the coercive power of the criminal justice system to select and 
supervise the “best” treatment option, with the specter of incarceration—
perhaps for a longer term than would have been imposed had the offender 
declined to participate in a mental health court
130—as a potential 
consequence of noncompliance. Using jail to force compliance with 
 
 
Mental health courts create stigma by segregating people by illness and then defining their uniqueness 
and irresponsibility in terms of the illness.”); see also William H. Fisher, Eric Silver & Nancy Wolff, 
Beyond Criminalization: Toward a Criminologically Informed Framework for Mental Health Policy 
and Services Research, 33 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RES. 
544, 549 (2006) (stating that the mental health court practice “reinforces the label of ‘person with 
mental illness’ as a ‘master status’—that status which above all others defines the individual’s position 
within the mental health system, the criminal justice system and society in general.”). 
 127. Indeed, some research suggests that the label “criminally insane” is doubly stigmatizing for 
this reason. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE 59 (2006) (arguing that the insanity 
defense, by drawing a direct connection between mental illness, crime, and nonresponsibility, 
generates a “double whammy” of stigma that exceeds the stigma associated with criminality alone). I 
am grateful to Professor Christopher Slobogin for raising this point. 
 128. For information on mental health service systems and treatment options available for various 
mental illnesses, see FRED C. OSHER & IRENE S. LEVINE, NAVIGATING THE MENTAL HEALTH MAZE 
(Bureau of Justice Assistance 2005), available at http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/Navigating-MHC-
Maze.pdf. 
 129. See, e.g., Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, supra note 36, at 
1067 (“Individuals usually appear before problem solving [sic] courts because of social or 
psychological problems they have not recognized, or because of their inability to deal with these 
problems effectively. . . . They may suffer from mental illness that impairs their judgment about the 
desirability of their continuing to take needed medication. They may be in denial about the existence 
of these problems, refusing to take responsibility for their wrongdoing, rationalizing their conduct, or 
minimizing its negative impact on themselves and others.”); John P. Coyne, Courts Try to Address 
Mental Ills: Emphasis on Treatment Tempers Punishment, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 26, 2006, 
at A1 (conveying that Judge Mary Jane Boyle, who oversees cases involving defendants with mental 
illnesses, said most crimes committed by such individuals occur when they stop taking their 
medications); Mary Orndorff, New Court to Aid Mental Inmates, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000, 
at 3C (characterizing Foster Cook, the director of an alternative treatment program, as blaming the 
involvement of individuals with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system on their lack of 
supervision and failure to take medication).  
 130. See Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 206. 
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treatment directives conveys a fundamental distrust of the proclivity of 
individuals with mental illnesses to make rational decisions and a lack of 
concern about how these individuals experience treatment.  
3. Trivializing Underlying Criminal Acts  
Mental health courts also differ from the traditional criminal justice 
system in the way they conceptualize the importance of the crime 
committed. Our justice system effects the determinations of 
democratically elected legislative bodies that certain acts are intolerable. 
The limited purpose of our criminal courts is to determine if a prohibited 
act was committed and, if so, to impose a permitted punishment that is, 
under retributive theory, commensurate with the culpability of the offender 
and the harm exacted by the crime.
131
 The formality of the process 
conveys the seriousness of the charge, and the imposition of punishment 
expresses society’s moral condemnation of the act, both to the offender132 
and to the community at large.
133
  
Conversely, in mental health courts, the crimes committed are 
trivialized. Allowing offenders with mental illnesses to evade traditional 
punishment sends a message that their conduct was, in some sense, 
tolerable, and that the harm incurred by their victims does not merit as 
punitive a response from the state. As David B. Rottman has observed, 
problem-solving court proceedings typically focus on the circumstances of 
individuals, “rather than the essence of the wrong they committed.”134 
 
 
 131. See F. H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 26–27 (1951); PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 12. 
 132. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370–71 (1981) (explaining that the 
message of retributive punishment is “this is how wrong what you did was” for the purpose of 
impressing on the offender the wrongness of his act and incentivizing his moral improvement); Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 401–04 (1965). 
 133. See Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 30 (Paul Edwards 
ed., 1967) (explaining that “punishment reinforces the community’s respect for its legal and moral 
standards, which criminal acts would tend to undermine if they were not solemnly denounced.”). Some 
retributivists have insisted that the primary audience for the condemnatory message that punishment 
embodies must be the criminal himself, and not a third party. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS 235–36 (1986) (“Though this condemnation is expressed to the criminal himself, 
punishment may also communicate to the public at large (and especially to potential criminals) as a 
reminder of the wrongness of the criminal’s conduct, and to the victims of crime an authoritative 
disavowal of such conduct. But if we are to avoid the charge that in pursuing a criminal we are simply 
using him as a means to some communicative purpose which is directed at others, its essential 
expressive aim must be that of communicating to the criminal himself as proper condemnation of his 
crime.”); E. Lea Johnston, Mental Illness, Suffering, and the Distribution of Deserved Punishment 45–
48 (draft on file with author). 
 134. David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized Courts 
(and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 24 (2000). 
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Mental health courts seek to bolster and encourage offenders as opposed to 
communicating blame to those offenders or to society.
135
 By choosing not 
to focus on blame or the meting out of punishment, mental health courts 
express insufficient condemnation of criminal acts.  
Furthermore, court-mandated treatment simply does not carry the same 
seriousness as incarceration.
136
 Mental health court participants, unlike 
those ineligible for participation in mental health courts, can gain valuable 
commodities (such as treatment, access to social services, and often 
additional assistance with housing, employment, or transportation)
137
 
while in most instances remaining free in the community. One could argue 
that the substitution of treatment for traditional punishment effectively 
serves to decriminalize those categories of crimes disproportionately 
committed by individuals with mental illnesses,
138
 or at least to limit the 
full enforcement of these criminal laws to non-ill offenders, thereby 
violating norms of equal treatment.
139
 In essence, exempting a broad 
category of offenders from the full reach of the criminal law may serve as 
a limited form of judicial nullification.
140
  
 
 
 135. Boldt, supra note 96, at 1218 (“[W]hile the criminal law component focuses on matters of 
individual responsibility and blame, the treatment component [of therapeutic problem-solving courts] 
defines the problem as one of individual pathology and personal recovery.”); See Faraci, supra note 
21, at 836 (stating that “the criminal justice system is concerned with responsibility and blame, while 
the therapeutic justice philosophy is concerned with the pathology and recovery”). 
 136. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1189, 
1201–02 (2011) (discussing research indicating that intermediate sanctions designed to achieve 
rehabilitative goals—such as mandated supervision or weekend sentences—may have lesser but 
comparable “punitive bite” as incarceration). 
 137. See Julie B. Raines & Glenn T. Laws, Mental Health Court Survey, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 4 
(2009) (reporting that mental health court participants receive services to help them function in their 
community, such as “job placement, job training, housing, mental health treatment programs, 
supportive services (emergency food, clothing, and personal care items), and after care follow-up”); 
Talesh, supra note 55, at 117 (“[C]ommunity and health agencies linked to courts provide pathways to 
assist offenders by offering such services as day treatment programs, individual therapy, intensive 
psychiatric rehabilitation programs, psychosocial clubs, and assertive community treatment teams.”).  
 138. See Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial 
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 
2067 (2002) (“[W]hat much of therapeutic jurisprudence is really about, at least in the criminal arena, 
is a de facto decriminalization of certain minor offenses which the mavens of the movement do not 
think should be punished, but which our Puritan ethos commands cannot be ignored.”). 
 139. See Nancy Wolff, Courting the Court: Courts as Agents for Treatment and Justice, in 
COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS 143, 
168–70 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003) (discussing how mental health courts produce unequal 
treatment). 
 140. See Morris B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs With Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2003) (“When judges ignore the law and treat someone’s crime as a disease, we 
call it therapeutic jurisprudence. When juries do the same thing, we call it nullification. As discussed 
below, the reality is that proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence want jurors to nullify in some cases 
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4. Incentivizing Individuals to Commit Crimes to Obtain Scarce 
Resources  
In addition to flouting retributive concerns, mental health courts also 
undermine goals of deterrence. Utilitarianism embraces two forms of 
deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence aims to discourage a 
particular offender from committing the same crime in the future in order 
to avoid incurring another punishment.
141
 For general deterrence, courts 
publicize the punishment imposed on an individual for a particular crime 
so that others will refrain from committing that crime and suffering a 
similar punishment.
142
 In imposing a response less severe than would inure 
under the traditional justice system, mental health courts should expect to 
yield weaker deterrent effects.
143
 Indeed, mental health courts may actually 
encourage individuals to commit certain crimes in order to obtain 
treatment and other services.
144
 Mental health courts may incentivize 
several categories of persons to commit crimes: the same individual, after 
his term of supervised treatment expires (to receive additional treatment 
and services);
145
 other individuals with mental illnesses who are 
predisposed to commit crimes; and other individuals with mental illnesses 
who are otherwise law-abiding but desperate to receive treatment. This 
perverse incentivization stems from the fact that there is currently a 
shortage of community mental healthcare services.
146
 In fact, recognition 
 
 
(e.g., those involving drugs) because they just don’t think certain acts (e.g., drug possession) should be 
punished.”) (emphasis in original).  
 In contrast, others have argued that mental health courts may penalize individuals with mental 
illnesses more harshly than non-ill offenders. Advocates from the Bazelon Center for Mental Health 
Law have argued that mental health courts should be limited to individuals who have committed 
serious felonies, because most misdemeanants should not have been arrested in the first place. See 
Seltzer, supra note 22, at 578; Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 23, at 147, 154. 
 141. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1282, 
1287 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (explaining the utilitarian theory of individual deterrence). 
 142. See generally id. at 1286 (explaining the utilitarian theory of general deterrence). For a 
justification of general deterrence from a “weak retributivist” standpoint that considers wrongdoing as 
making a crucial moral diference as to how an individual justifiably may be treated, see Daniel M. 
Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 38, 38–60 
(Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1995). 
 143. See Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”, supra note 107, at 81–83. 
 144. See Frank & McGuire, supra note 10, at 28 n.22; Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra 
note 20, at 433. Because no individual is guaranteed placement in a mental health court, however, such 
a gamble would carry significant risks. 
 145. See, e.g., Lisa Shoaf, A Case Study of the Akron Mental Health Court, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 
975, 976 (2004) (noting that the Akron mental health court targets repeat offenders); Mental Health 
Court Set, CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 26, 2000, at 21A (noting that the Ohio mental health court targets 
repeat offenders).  
 146. See Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra note 20, at 433. 
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of this very shortage led to the creation of mental health courts in the first 
place.
147
 In addition, some individuals with mental illnesses ambivalent 
about treatment might choose to commit crimes in order to access the 
other services that many mental health courts provide, such as travel 
vouchers, job or educational assistance, and assistance securing housing 
and social welfare benefits. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the 
value of this additional assistance is so great that people without a 
diagnosable mental health condition might even fake symptoms of mental 
illness to access these services through mental health court participation.
148
  
In sum, mental health courts advance values at odds with those of the 
traditional justice system. In failing to determine the degree to which 
mental illness or choice motivated the offender’s criminal act, mental 
health courts may impose penalties disproportionate to an offender’s just 
deserts. Mental health courts also project characterizations of offenders 
with mental illnesses as nonautonomous, irrational, driven by their mental 
illnesses, and unable to control their behavior—images that are misleading 
and stigmatizing, as well as contradictory to the central premise of 
retribution and deterrence. Significantly, mental health courts trivialize 
predicate crimes. Finally, because they offer scarce social goods, mental 
health courts may perversely incentivize individuals to commit crimes to 
gain access to treatment and other valuable services.  
Therapeutic jurisprudence professes an inability to mediate between 
competing norms and values.
149
 Because the values advanced and 
expressed by mental health courts and the traditional justice system 
conflict to a significant extent, therapeutic jurisprudence by its very terms 
cannot provide justification for the mental health court model. The next 
Part investigates the extent to which the penal theory of therapeutic 
rehabilitation may fill this void.  
 
 
 147. See, e.g., Stefan & Winick, supra note 11, at 511 (identifying the lack of access to adequate 
community mental health services as part of “the problem that mental health courts are intended to 
solve”); Jenni Bergal, Justice that Works, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 24, 2002, at 1A (linking the 
creation of the Broward Mental Health Court with the insufficient number of community programs to 
treat individuals with mental illnesses). 
 148. Faking symptoms of mental illness is unlikely to result in admittance to those mental health 
courts that require a prior diagnosis of mental illness. See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text. 
For a discussion of similar issues in the context of drug treatment courts, see Quinn, Whose Team, 
supra note 21, at 60–61. 
 149. See supra notes 75–79. 
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II. THERAPEUTIC REHABILITATION 
As an alternative to therapeutic jurisprudence, rehabilitation possibly 
could justify the existence of mental health courts. Several prominent 
commentators—most notably Professor Richard C. Boldt,150 Professor 
James L. Nolan,
151
 Judge John A. Bozza,
152
 and Judge Morris B. 
Hoffman
153—have argued persuasively that drug treatment courts 
represent in many ways a return to a rehabilitative theory of 
punishment.
154
 Similarly, mental health courts, in seeking to address the 
underlying source of offenders’ criminality, expressly articulate 
rehabilitative purposes.
155
 In particular, mental health courts appear to 
embrace a therapeutic or medical model of rehabilitation, where criminal 
behavior is viewed as symptomatic of offenders’ mental illnesses and 
mental health treatment is believed necessary to reduce future offending. 
A. Definition  
The social welfare or penal theory of rehabilitation is premised on the 
malleability of human character
156
 and derives from an abiding faith in the 
 
 
 150. See Boldt, supra note 96, at 1212–18, 1226–34, 1237, 1243–45 (arguing that, while drug 
treatment courts do not occasion a full return to the rehabilitative ideal, the courts possess multiple 
rehabilitative elements and should thus be subjected to the critiques levied against rehabilitation in the 
late 1960s and 1970s). 
 151. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 
185–208 (2001); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning 
of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1554–63 (2003). 
 152. See Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”, supra note 107, at 62–64.  
 153. See Morris B. Hoffman, Booker, Pragmatism and the Moral Jury, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
455, 460 (2005) (expressing that the “ghosts” of rehabilitationism have been reincarnated in 
therapeutic jurisprudence); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 966 
n.55 (2003); Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, supra note 138; Morris B. 
Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 176–77 
(2001); Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1479 n.166 (2000). 
 154. See also Phillip Bean, Drug Courts, the Judge and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in DRUG 
COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 235, 244–51 (James L. Nolan ed., 2002) (exploring the 
relationship between drug treatment courts and rehabilitation). 
 155. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 36, at 3 (“[I]n general, mental health courts are all 
attempting a rehabilitative response to what would otherwise have been criminally sanctioned 
behavior.”); id. at 46–50 (expanding upon and defending the idea that therapeutic jurisprudence 
requires a justice system to be sympathetic to underlying causes of crime); Teresa W. Carns, Michael 
G. Hotchkin & Elaine M. Andrews, Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 
4 (2002) (listing these sentencing goals of therapeutic courts: “To correct or heal the offender, who 
receives most services and benefits. Society is secondary; victim benefits to the extent that offender is 
rehabilitated.”).  
 156. ALLEN, supra note 96, at 11–18 (examining beliefs about the malleability of human character 
in societies in which the rehabilitative ideal emerged and thrived); William D. McColl, Theory and 
Practice in the Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court, in DRUG COURTS, supra note 154, at 13. 
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scientific control of human behavior.
157
 Rehabilitation, broadly speaking, 
uses sociological and psychological criteria to identify individuals who 
pose social risk and seeks to reform aspects of delinquent character 
through individualized treatment.
158
 Rehabilitation conceptualizes crime as 
the product of antecedent causes that are capable of identification and 
control.
159
 These antecedent causes, depending on the theorist and 
offender, may consist of biological components, environmental or social 
factors, or deficiencies in moral character.
160
  
 
 
 157. See Enrico Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra 
note 96, at 229, 229 (“We must now draw the logical conclusions, in theory and practice, from the 
teachings of experimental science, for the removal of the gangrenous plague of crime.”); Sheldon 
Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1928), reprinted in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 96, at 279 (“Effective individualization must be based upon as complete an 
understanding of each offender as modern science will permit. Hence psychiatry, psychology, and 
social case work—not to mention those disciplines more remotely concerned with the problems of 
human motivation and behavior—must be drawn into the program for administering criminal 
justice.”). 
 158. See Eric Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1510 (2004) (defining the elements of “penal welfarism,” or 
the rehabilitative ideal); see also ALLEN, supra note 96, at 2 (1981) (defining rehabilitation as “the 
notion that a primary purpose of penal treatment is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and 
behavior of convicted offenders, so as to strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but 
also to contribute to the welfare and satisfaction of offenders”). Francis A. Allen has crystallized these 
essential points of rehabilitation:  
The rehabilitative ideal is itself a complex of ideas which, perhaps, defies completely precise 
statement. The essential points, however, can be articulated. It is assumed, first, that human 
behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified as part of the 
physical universe and it is the obligation of the scientist to discover and to describe them with 
all possible exactitude. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes possible an 
approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally, and of primary significance for 
the purposes at hand, it is assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender 
should serve a therapeutic function, that such measures should be designed to effect changes 
in the behavior of the convicted person in the interest of his own happiness, health, and 
satisfaction and in the interest of social defense. 
Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION, supra note 19, at 173; see also Henry Weihoffen, Punishment and Treatment: 
Rehabilitation, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 96, at 255, 255–56 (restating these “essential 
points”). 
 159. See Allen, supra note 158, at 173. 
 160. See Ferri, supra note 157, at 237 (suggesting that poverty, childhood abandonment, and 
trampdom are conditions resulting in crime); MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 38, 
at 262 (citing estimates that 30 percent of offenders are driven by situational difficulties, 30 percent by 
psychological problems, and another 30 percent by antisocial tendencies); see also John Terrence A. 
Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Drug Treatment Courts: Integrating Law and Science, in 
DRUG COURTS, supra note 154, at 150 (“The rehabilitative theory works on the assumption that the 
criminal has committed a crime due to some underlying pathology like a mental or physical illness, or 
from learned antisocial behavior.”). In the words of Francis Allen, because the rehabilitative ideal does 
not necessarily specify a theory of crime causation, the definition “does not resolve the perennial 
controversies between freedom of the will and determinism, although modern expressions of the 
rehabilitative ideal lean heavily to the latter.” ALLEN, supra note 96, at 3.  
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A prominent aim of rehabilitation is to enhance public safety by 
eliminating or lessening criminal recidivism.
161
 This goal is achieved by 
reforming offenders’ behavior and attitudes so that they conform to those 
identified as socially beneficial.
162
 An important anticipated byproduct of 
rehabilitation is improvement in offenders’ health and welfare,163 so 
rehabilitation has been associated with humanitarian motivations “and a 
willingness to expend effort to reclaim [an offender] for his own sake and 
not merely to keep him from again harming us.”164 Advocates believe that 
rehabilitation is superior to other justifications of punishment because “no 
other [theory] gives as much promise of returning the offender to society 
not with the negative vacuum of punishment-induced fear but with the 
affirmative and constructive equipment—physical, mental and moral—for 
law-abidingness.”165  
The therapeutic or medical model of rehabilitation is one strand of 
rehabilitative theory.
166
 Therapeutic rehabilitation is based on a medical 
model of crime, in which an offender is “sick” and in need of a state-
coerced “cure.”167 Proponents of therapeutic rehabilitation believe that 
criminals suffer from a physical, mental, or social pathology that is 
susceptible to diagnosis and treatment, largely by psychiatrists.
168
 The 
writings of Karl Menninger
169
 and Benjamin Karpman,
170
 two eminent 
 
 
 161. ALLEN, supra note 96, at 27 (“[Rehabilitationism] seeks, most importantly, to strengthen the 
social defense against criminal acts by eliminating or lessening criminal recidivism.”); see also Karl 
Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 96, at 245 (“[O]ur object in 
all this is to protect the community from a repetition of the offense by the most economical method 
consonant with our other purposes.”). 
 162. ALLEN, supra note 96, at 27–28; Weihoffen, supra note 158, at 256 (“The main objective is 
to change the person’s attitudes and to help him cope with his circumstances, gain insight into his own 
motivations, reorient his feelings, and achieve a measure of self-control.”). 
 163. See ALLEN, supra note 96, at 2, 27–28. 
 164. Weihoffen, supra note 158, at 256. 
 165. Id. at 261. 
 166. For a description of the tenets and evolution of therapeutic rehabilitation, see ROTMAN, supra 
note 41, at 60–63. The other three strands of rehabilitation include the penitentiary model, which 
predates the therapeutic theory, and the social learning and rights oriented model, both of which 
followed the therapeutic model. Id. at 4–6. The strands differ in the means used to achieve 
rehabilitation and in the roles and powers of rehabilitative agents. Id. at 4.  
 167. See ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 5, 63, 66.  
 168. See id. at 60, 62; Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals, supra note 38, at 373 (“[T]he time will 
come, when stealing or murder will be thought of as a symptom, indicating the presence of a 
disease.”); Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, supra note 38, at 135–36; see also Kyron Huigens, 
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2002) (in context of drug treatment courts). 
 169. See, e.g., MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 38 (arguing that criminal 
behavior is the system of disease and that the appropriate response is treatment by medical 
professionals, not punishment); Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals, supra note 38, at 373; Menninger, 
Therapy, Not Punishment, supra note 38, at 135–38 (outlining a “scientific” response to crime). 
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psychiatrists and leading proponents of therapeutic rehabilitation, reflect 
this preoccupation with discovering and treating the psycho-medical 
origins of crime. 
Proponents of rehabilitation believe that the criminal justice system has 
a duty to diagnose the causal factors underlying an individual’s criminality 
and to generate an appropriate treatment plan.
171
 The framing of offenders 
as patients or victims to be cured, as opposed to responsible moral agents 
whose predicament is the product of their will,
172
 supports a broad 
paternalism, in which the state is better equipped than an offender to 
identify his path to reform.
173
 The aim of rehabilitation is to reform the 
offender rather than to punish him in response to a particular criminal 
act,
174
 so typical limits on state action, grounded in relevance, fall away.
175
 
In essence, to achieve rehabilitation, state-ordered treatment should vary 
as the treatment needs of individuals charged with similar crimes vary.
176
  
 
 
 170. See, e.g., KARPMAN, CASE STUDIES, supra note 39 (presenting four case studies of criminals 
to facilitate an understanding of the psychogenic factors underlying criminality); KARPMAN, THE 
SEXUAL OFFENDER, supra note 39 (exploring the etiology and psyhotherapeutic treatment of sexual 
offenders); Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform, supra note 39, at 119 (explaining the 
importance of criminal psychodynamics and concluding that “criminality is but a symptom of 
insanity”); id. at 131 (“Criminal psychodynamics sees criminality as basically a psychiatric, extra-legal 
problem. . . . It views criminality, however incidental it may seem on the surface, as a basic human 
expression having a long history and evolution and a pathology all its own. It sees in criminality a 
disease sui generis, a severe disease which, however, can be cured or prevented when and if proper 
psychotherapeutic measures are taken.”). 
 171. See Glueck, supra note 157, at 273 (expressing that society has “a duty to use every 
reasonable instrumentality for the rehabilitation of its anti-social members” and that a criminal “has a 
right, in justice, to be treated with those instrumentalities that give him the greatest promise of self-
improvement and rehabilitation”).  
 172. See Zvi D. Gabbay, Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of 
Restorative Justice Practices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 390–91 (2005) (“In essence, the rehabilitative 
ideal views offenders as ‘patients’ or ‘victims,’ who commit crimes because of an ‘illness’ or under the 
influence of a dysfunctional social environment. . . . The deeper meaning of this approach, however, is 
that offenders are not to be morally blamed for their wrongdoing. They are not responsible for their 
criminal act; instead, their sickness is to blame.”). 
 173. See MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 38, at 265 (“Some individuals 
have to be protected against themselves, some have to be protected from other prisoners, some even 
from the community.”). 
 174. See ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that rehabilitation “incorporates a concept of 
justice that goes beyond the symmetrical reaction of retribution and inquires into the subjective reality 
of the offender”). 
 175. See ALLEN, supra note 96, at 47 (observing that “when there are no clear limits on what may 
be relevant to the treatment process and when the goals of treatment have not been clearly defined, the 
idea of relevance as a regulator of public authority is destroyed or impaired”); Boldt, supra note 96, at 
1239 (tracing the origins of this critique). 
 176. See Boldt, supra note 96, at 1224 (“[T]he length and conditions of a criminal sentence must 
be tailored to effect beneficial change in those traits of the individual defendant’s personality, 
character, or behavioral patterns associated with past untoward conduct and predicted future 
behavior.”). 
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Mental health courts appear to embrace a particular version of 
therapeutic rehabilitation, one that is narrowly focused on the causal 
relationship between certain mental illnesses and crime. This brand of 
therapeutic rehabilitation is based on two propositions. First, mental health 
courts justify segregating and diverting individuals with certain mental 
illnesses on the ground that their illnesses likely contributed to their 
criminal behavior.
177
 Second, mental health courts operate under the 
assumption that the amelioration of symptoms of these mental illnesses 
will reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior. The next section 
details the empirical evidence on the relationship between mental illness 
and crime and explores its implications for mental health courts as 
rehabilitative institutions.  
B. Central Factual Assumptions 
Mental health courts understand their rehabilitative mission as a 
therapeutic response to the strong, causal relationship between certain 
mental illnesses and crime.
178
 For more than eighty years, psychologists 
and psychiatrists have explored the extent to which mental illnesses 
correlate with violence. More recently, social scientists have begun to 
examine the degree to which mental illnesses may manifest in criminal 
 
 
 177. This first premise was not necessary to therapeutic rehabilitation as it was articulated in the 
early to mid-twentieth century. The commission of a criminal act generally was understood to be a 
necessary predicate for State action, see, e.g., MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 
38, at 18 (explaining that the fact that an individual “has broken the law gives us a technical reason for 
acting on behalf of society to try to do something that will lead him to react more acceptably, and 
which will protect the environment in the meantime”), but philosophical accounts did not tie the 
legitimacy of rehabilitation to diagnosing a pathology for that particular criminal act. Instead, once an 
individual was subject to State control, therapeutic rehabilitative theory held that the State had the duty 
to diagnose and treat the underlying pathologies responsible for the offenders’ criminal behavior (past 
and future). See id. 
 178. See, e.g., Stefan & Winick, supra note 11, at 507 (statement by Bruce J. Winick) (identifying 
the “basic assumption underlying the mental health court model [as] that, for at least some defendants 
charged with minor nonviolent offenses and, in some cases, even for those charged with felonies, the 
problem is more a product of mental illness than of criminality”); id. at 511 (“Given the assumed 
relationship between these individuals’ mental illness and their criminal behavior, these courts, by 
motivating and assisting them to participate in treatment, also function to protect the community from 
future crime.”); Rita Hoover, Mental Health Court Coming to Kane County, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2006, 
at 2 (identifying untreated mental illness as “the underlying condition—the cause of the behavior” and 
articulating a key mental health court goal as “‘stopping the revolving door’ of incarceration for people 
whose mental illness causes them to break laws or commit crimes”); Interview with Judy Harris 
Kluger, Deputy Chief Admin. Judge, Center for Court Innovation (Oct. 2007), available at http://www 
.courtinnovation.org/research/judy-harris-kluger-deputy-chief-administrative-judge-court-operations-and-
planning-new-york (observing that mental illness drives the crimes of some mentally ill offenders and 
that court-supervised treatment should make “the criminal conduct driven by the mental illness . . . 
stop”). 
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behavior, including in the commission of nonviolent misdemeanors. This 
research, while tentative, suggests that mental health courts as presently 
constituted sweep too broadly to comport with the rehabilitative mission 
expressed by the courts. 
1. Assumption that Mental Illness Contributed to Predicate Offense 
At the core of mental health courts is a belief that, were it not for 
eligible offenders’ mental illnesses, these individuals would not have 
engaged in the criminal behavior that prompted their arrest. According to 
Professor Winick, Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren created one of the nation’s 
first mental health courts upon realizing that “many of the minor offenders 
in criminal court were there because they had committed nuisance offenses 
that were more a product of their untreated mental illness than of 
criminality.”179 Similarly, Judge Judy Harris Kluger has located the origin 
of New York’s mental health court initiative in the growing recognition 
“that there were mentally ill defendants who did not belong necessarily in 
jail or prison because what drove their crime was mental illness.”180 Other 
mental health court judges have made similar comments.
181
 Indeed, this 
observation is not controversial: commentators on mental health courts 
have universally noted the assumed nexus between mental illness and 
criminal behavior.
182
 Even some advocates of individuals with mental 
 
 
 179. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with 
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 538 (2009). 
 180. Interview with Judy Harris Kluger, supra note 178. 
 181. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 110, at 1 (quoting Judge Jim Fuhrmeister as stating about 
eligible offenders: “The root of their problem is mental illness.”); James D. Cayce & Kari Burrell, 
King County’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach for Coordinating Justice Services, 
WASH. ST. BAR NEWS (June 1999) (remarking that the mental health court system exists for those 
interested in receiving treatment “to ameliorate the mental health conditions that contribute to their 
unlawful behavior”); HOPE Court Gives Offenders an Alternative to Jail Time, TIMES RECORDER, 
Oct. 23, 2008, at A3 (“Presiding Judge Eric D. Martin said the program is designed for those who may 
not have committed a crime if it weren’t for a mental illness or behavioral issue.”). 
 182. See, e.g., ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 18 (observing that “the perceived cause of the 
rule-breaking is mental illness”); Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 212–13 (“[Mental health 
courts] are instituted on the assumption that a serious mental illness is related to an individual’s 
criminal behavior.”); Stefan & Winick, supra note 11, at 507 (statement by Bruce J. Winick); Wolff, 
Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra note 20, at 432 (“Mental health courts assume uncritically that 
criminal behavior is caused by a psychiatric problem and that the only way to stop the criminal 
behavior is to treat the illness causing the behavior.”); Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization of the 
Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 
UMKC L. Rev. 193, 194–95 (2002) (“In almost every case, the criminal acts of the offender ‘are really 
manifestations of their illness, their lack of treatment, and the lack of structure in their lives.’”).  
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illnesses have assumed that the crimes committed by these individuals 
often stem from their disability.
183
  
Many mental health courts, however, fail to ensure the existence of this 
causal relationship for their participants. Mental health courts vary in the 
extent to which they require a diagnosis—or even evidence—of a severe 
mental illness.
184
 In addition, many courts do not require a demonstrated 
link between an individual’s mental illness and his criminal act.185 And, 
significantly, social science research demonstrates that individuals with 
mental illnesses, like the general offender population, have varying 
motivations for committing crimes.
186
 Together, these data call into 
question the assumption that, for individuals diverted to mental health 
courts, their illnesses are to blame for their criminal acts.  
a. Eligibility Requirements of Mental Health Courts 
A substantial proportion of mental health courts do not require 
participants to carry a diagnosis of a severe mental illness as a prerequisite 
for admittance.
187
 A 2006 study of 110 mental health courts, conducted by 
Steven K. Erickson and his colleagues, found that 21 percent of courts 
required the presence of a “severe” mental illness,188 or a mental illness 
that seriously affects the functioning of individuals and places them in the 
highest category of clinical need.
189
 The report found that another 38 
 
 
 183. See Seltzer, supra note 22, at 582 (“Public safety is not protected when people who have 
mental illnesses are needlessly arrested for nuisance crimes or when the mental illness at the root of a 
criminal act is exacerbated by a system designed for punishment, not treatment.”); Bernstein & Seltzer, 
supra note 23, at 160 (same); Maura Yates, New Mental Health Court on Staten Island Will Steer 
Defendants to Treatment, STATEN ISLAND REAL TIME NEWS, June 28, 2010, http://www.silive.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2010/06/new_mental_health_court_on_sta.html (quoting National Alliance on Mental 
Illness Staten Island Executive Director Linda Wilson as stating: “Very often, people with mental 
illness commit crimes because of their illness and not because of criminality.”). But see Bernstein & 
Seltzer, supra, at 23 (“Certainly, not every crime committed by an individual diagnosed with a mental 
illness is attributable to disability or to the failure of public mental health.”). 
 184. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
 185. See infra notes 201, 206–13 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 217–33 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Redlich et al., Patterns of Practice in Mental Health Courts, supra note 22, at 349 
(noting that, while some mental health courts only admit persons with serious and persistent mental 
illness, others only require “demonstrable mental health problems”); Wolff & Pogorzelski, supra note 
13, at 555–56 (“[S]ome courts may require that the person have a serious mental disorder that is 
diagnosed by a mental health professional using clinically valid instruments and procedures, whereas 
others may require only that the person have a mental health problem.”). 
 188. See Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 339. 
 189. ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 11. Illnesses considered “severe” include schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, severe forms of depression, panic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Id. 
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percent of courts required a diagnosis of an Axis I disorder,
190
 a slightly 
more expansive category that includes clinical syndromes such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as chronic brain 
diseases that cause extreme distress and interfere with social and 
emotional adjustment.
191
 Almost half of surveyed courts either required a 
diagnosis of some “mental illness”192 or did not require any diagnosis at 
all.
193
 Two studies conducted in 2005 reported similar findings.
194
 In short, 
while a majority of mental health courts require a diagnosis of serious 
mental illness, many do not.
195
  
Mental health courts also differ in the extent to which they require, for 
purpose of admission, a demonstrated nexus between an offender’s mental 
illness and his crime. The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act mandates, for mental health courts’ receipt of federal 
funding, that qualified offenders have committed an offense that “is the 
product of the person’s mental illness.”196 Relatedly, the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, charged with administering the federal mental health courts 
program, recommends that “[m]ental health courts should . . . focus on 
defendants whose mental illness is related to their current offenses.”197 
 
 
 190. See Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 339. 
 191. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS XXIV 13–24, 28 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; see also Lurigio & 
Snowden, supra note 12, at 197. 
 192. See Erickson et al., supra note 10, at 339 (finding that 28 percent of courts required a 
diagnosis of “mental illness”). 
 193. See id. at 339 (finding that 18 percent of mental health courts did not provide any diagnostic 
eligibility criteria). The rationale for allowing offenders without a diagnosed mental illness to 
participate in mental health courts is that, for some, the arrest for bizarre behavior will be the first 
indication that the person may suffer from a mental illness. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 23, at 
149 n.20. 
 194. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 10 (presenting the results of a 2005 study conducted 
by the Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project reporting that, of the ninety mental health 
courts surveyed, 37 percent accepted individuals with an Axis I diagnosis, 21 percent accepted 
individuals with a “serious and/or serious and persistent” mental illness, 26 percent had no admissions 
criteria involving mental illness, and 16 percent had some specifications for the types of mental 
illnesses they would accept but did not report what those specifications were); Lurigio & Snowden, 
supra note 12, at 205 (discussing the findings of a 2005 study by the National Survey of Mental Health 
Courts, which found that one-third of the surveyed courts required an Axis I diagnosis; approximately 
25 percent mandated that the offender have a “severe and persistent mental illness;” and 4 percent 
defined mental illness as including only the categories schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, and major depression).  
 195. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 23, at 149 n.20 (mentioning the King County mental 
health court by name).  
 196. See 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa(a)(9)(B) (2006) (definition of “preliminary qualified offender”). 
 197. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., IMPROVING RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT 2 (2008), available at http:// 
consensusproject.org/jc_publications/essential-elements-of-a-mental-health-court/mhc-essential-
elements.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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However, according to a 2005 report sponsored by the Bureau, “[t]here is 
no recognized measure to assess the degree to which an alleged offense 
was ‘caused by’ a person’s illness, and courts vary widely in how they 
apply this standard, if at all.”198  
To date, there has been no comprehensive study of the extent to which 
mental health courts require a causal link between an offender’s mental 
illness and his criminal act.
199
 My review of the policy statements, 
eligibility criteria, and news coverage of mental health courts in existence 
in March 2010 revealed a great variance in the degree to which mental 
health courts require evidence of such a connection.
200
  
It appears that a minority of mental health courts require evidence of a 
relationship between an offender’s mental illness and his alleged criminal 
act. One set of researchers, relying on data from the 2005 National Survey 
of Mental Health Courts, estimated that only 8 percent of courts “limited 
participation to [offenders] whose mental illnesses contributed directly to 
the offense for which they were charged.”201 Generally, courts that call for 
a demonstrated relationship do not require that mental illness be the 
predominant cause of an offense. For example, to be eligible for admission 
to the Jackson County Pilot Mental Health Treatment Court in Michigan, 
the treatment team must determine that the individual’s mental illness 
“contributed” to his offense.202 Similarly, eligibility for acceptance to San 
Francisco’s Behavioral Health Court depends upon a defendant’s having 
been charged with or convicted of an offense “where the behavior that led 
to the offense was connected to mental illness.”203 To participate in the 
Lancaster County Adult Mental Health Court in Pennsylvania, “[t]he 
 
 
 198. GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN, supra note 3, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 199. Some researchers have studied the eligibility criteria of a select number of jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE 
CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN 
BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE viii (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2000), available at http://www 
.ncjrs.gov/ html/bja/mentalhealth/contents.html (finding that four mental health courts only accept 
persons with demonstrable mental illness likely to have contributed to their criminal acts); Wolff et al., 
Mental Health Courts and Their Selection Processes, supra note 108, at app. (finding that two of six 
analyzed mental health courts screen out cases which lack a clear connection between the crime and 
mental illness and a third court accepts violent felonies only if the crime was strongly or directly 
linked to mental illness or the victim was a family member). 
 200. See infra note 212 (explicating my research methodology). Jon Bense, who served as my 
Public Interest Research Fellow, was of great assistance in compiling and analyzing this data.  
 201. See Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 205. 
 202. JACKSON CNTY. PILOT MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT COURT, MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING 4, 
available at http://www.d12.com/county_courts/d12/docs/MHCMemo.pdf.  
 203. SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF S.F. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COURT, POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 2 (July 2008), available at http://www.sfbar.org/forms/lawyerreferrals/ida/ 
BHC_manual.pdf.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
556 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:519 
 
 
 
 
conduct giving rise to the crime must be attributable to characteristics of 
the defendant’s mental illness.”204 Of note, courts may be more likely to 
require a demonstrated nexus between an offender’s mental illness and his 
criminal activity when the charged predicate offense was violent.
205
  
Other mental health courts include a nexus concept in their policy 
statements or lists of professed goals but do not require, as an explicit 
eligibility criterion, a finding of any causal link between mental illness and 
an offender’s criminal act. The Richland County Mental Health Court in 
South Carolina, for example, communicates its intent to treat the root 
cause of an offender’s criminal behavior without, apparently, imposing an 
explicit nexus requirement for eligibility. The purpose of the court is “to 
address the inappropriate involvement of mentally ill individuals . . . in the 
criminal justice system, charged with misdemeanor and/or non-violent 
felony offenses, resulting mainly from untreated symptoms of psychiatric 
and co-occurring disorders.”206 The court’s eligibility criteria, while 
detailed, do not include any relationship between mental illness and 
criminal behavior.
207
 It remains unclear whether the goal-related language 
supporting the court’s purpose, “to address inappropriate involvement . . . 
in the criminal justice system . . . resulting mainly from untreated 
symptoms of [mental] disorders,” reflects a conceptual assumption about 
the relationship between mental illness and crime, or whether it signals the 
practical reality that an individualized determination takes place for each 
offender prior to admittance to the court. 
Finally, some mental health courts do not even profess a goal (at least 
publicly) of selecting and treating offenders whose crimes derived from 
 
 
 204. LANCASTER CNTY. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ADULT MENTAL HEALTH COURT, 
PARTICIPANT CRITERIA, available at http://www.co.lancaster.pa.us/courts/lib/courts/apps/mhc/mhc_ 
criteria.pdf; see also Janet Kelley, Mental Health Court Opens Here: Judge Hears 1st Case, 
INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL/NEW ERA (Lancaster, PA), Mar. 24, 2010, at A1 (attributing this statement 
to a mental health court judge: “In order for a defendant to qualify for [the] mental health court . . . the 
crime has to have a direct connection to the mental illness.”).  
 205. See, e.g., KOOTENAI CNTY., IDAHO, MENTAL HEALTH COURT PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 6 
(May 2008), available at http://www.kcgov.us/departments/districtcourt/forms/20081209_Mental 
%20Health%20Court%20Handbook_pdf_Handbook_Mental%20Health%20Court%20Handbook.
pdf (specifying that violent offenders, who may be admitted to the mental health court on a case-by-
case basis, will be assessed to see whether the offense was linked to mental illness); Wolff et al., 
Mental Health Courts and Their Selection Processes, supra note 108, at app; SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF ILL., WINNEBAGO CNTY. MENTAL HEALTH COURT, http://www.co 
.winnebago.il.us/judicial_court/WCMHC.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (allowing admission for 
misdemeanors involving a weapon and certain felony offenses involving bodily injury if mental illness 
is a causative factor in the offense). 
 206. RICHLAND CNTY., SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE COURT, MENTAL HEALTH COURT, http:// 
www.richlandonline.com/departments/probate/mentalhealthcourt.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
 207. Id. 
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their mental illnesses. For instance, the purpose of the mental health court 
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, appears to be merely to divert offenders 
diagnosed with certain serious forms of mental illness from the traditional 
justice system. The single stated goal of the court is to identify mentally 
disordered or developmentally disabled offenders and link them to 
treatment.
208
 In addition to restricting access to offenders who commit 
certain crimes,
209
 the only other eligibility criterion consists of a recent 
diagnosis of a severe mental illness with a psychotic feature or a clinical 
diagnosis that the defendant has an “IQ of seventy-five or less and/or an 
adaptive skills deficit.”210 The court appears to have expressed no concern 
that offenses stem from participants’ illnesses in any policy statement or 
eligibility criterion, or in practice.
211
  
I was unable to locate any nexus requirement—in court rules or 
materials, or as reported in policy statements or secondary sources—for 
many mental health courts around the country.
212
 For instance, mental 
health courts in these jurisdictions appear to lack a nexus requirement: 
Jefferson County, Alabama; Montgomery County, Alabama; the Delaware 
Court of Common Pleas; Alachua County, Florida; Brevard County, 
Florida; Charlotte County, Florida; Collier County, Florida; Nassau 
County, Florida; Polk County, Florida; Ada County, Idaho; Bannock 
County, Idaho; Bonneville County, Idaho; Ionia County (Eighth Circuit), 
Michigan; Boone County (Thirteenth Judicial Circuit), Missouri; 
Missoula, Montana; Clark County, Nevada; Bernalillo County, New 
 
 
 208. CUYAHOGA CNTY. MENTAL HEALTH COURT INITIATIVE, CUYAHOGA COUNTY MENTAL 
HEALTH COURT INITIATIVE BROCHURE, available at http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/courtdocs/ 
mhbrochure.pdf. 
 209. See JUSTICE CTR., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO MENTAL 
HEALTH COURT DOCKET INITIATIVE, http://www.consensusproject.org/program_examples/cuyahoga_ 
county_ohio_mental_health_court_docket_initiative (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (listing clinical and 
legal eligibility criteria). 
 210. CUYAHOGA CNTY. MENTAL HEALTH COURT INITIATIVE, supra note 208; CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT R. 30.1, ASSIGNMENT OF CRIMINAL CASES TO MENTAL HEALTH 
DOCKETS, available at http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/LocalRules.aspx?ID=34. 
 211. But see Coyne, supra note 129, at A1 (“Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Mary Jane 
Boyle, one of five county judges overseeing cases with mentally ill defendants, said most crimes 
committed by the mentally ill happen when the individual is off his or her medications.”).  
 212. To establish this list, my research assistant and I searched individual mental health court 
websites and read all program information, policy statements, local court rules, brochures, and 
manuals. We ran searches in Lexis and Westlaw for mental health court requirements as provided in 
statutes, regulations, state and local court rules, and administrative orders. We searched for data on 
mental health court eligibility requirements in psychological journals as well as in law reviews and 
periodicals. We ran a Google search for mental health court policy and procedure manual. We also 
reviewed information on mental health courts compiled by the Criminal Justice Mental Health 
Consensus Project, the Center for Mental Health Services’ National GAINS Center, and the National 
Center for State Courts.  
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Mexico; Butler County, Ohio; Davidson County, Tennessee; and Salt Lake 
County, Utah. For many of these courts, information on eligibility criteria 
is publicly available, a fact that provides some confidence that the lack of 
a specified nexus requirement holds significance. There are dozens of 
additional mental health courts without obvious nexus requirements, but 
so little information is publicly available about the workings of these 
courts that any representation about their lack of a specific criterion would 
be inappropriate.
213
  
The creators of mental health courts may assume that requiring eligible 
offenders to produce a diagnosis or other evidence of mental illness 
suffices to ensure that their criminal behavior was a product of that mental 
illness. This assumption, however, is belied by research on the 
psychological precursors to crime.
214
  
b. The Varying Motivations for Crime of Individuals with Mental 
Illnesses  
Individuals diagnosed with Axis I disorders
215
 are able to control their 
behavior and engage in rational thought much of the time.
216
 Thus, 
offenders with mental illnesses, like nondisordered offenders, may 
 
 
 213. It is of course possible that our searches failed to uncover some public information on mental 
health court eligibility criteria. It is also probable that some judges, district attorneys, or treatment 
teams typically require evidence of a connection between an individual’s offense and his mental 
illness, but this practice is not mandated in a court rule or publicized on a court website or in a 
brochure or manual. Finally, mental health courts evolve quickly, and some of the courts listed above 
might have changed their procedures since my analysis was conducted in March 2010. 
 214. See infra notes 250–53, 260, and 274–99 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (observing that “most severely ill people—
even those commonly termed ‘psychopaths’—retain some ability to control their behavior”); THOMAS 
G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 221 (3d ed. 
2000) (“The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, mental retardation, or some other form of mental 
illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence.”); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy 
Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 573 (1978) 
(discussing a meta-analysis of 300 studies of schizophrenia and quoting the conclusion that “it is clear 
that most schizophrenics function no differently on these experimental tests from most normals”); 
Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 534, 569 (1995) (“Not all individuals suffering from the major mental illnesses will 
be rendered cognitively or volitionally impaired . . . . The extent of functional impairment produced by 
these conditions varies widely within each diagnostic category, with the result that assignment of a 
particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability.”). See generally Morse, 
supra, at 573. (“It is a striking clinical commonplace that crazy persons behave normally a great deal 
of the time and in many ways. Even when they are in the midst of a period of crazy behavior, much of 
their behavior will be normal. Further, between crazy periods crazy people are not reliably 
distinguishable from normal persons.”). 
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experience differing motivations for committing crimes.
217
 Research 
demonstrates that, while some individuals with mental illnesses may 
commit minor offenses that appear to stem from their disorders (such as 
disorderly conduct), others may commit “survival” crimes (such as petty 
theft and panhandling) because they are poor.
218
 Still others may commit 
crimes of a more serious nature (such as burglary and assault) where their 
mental illnesses appear incidental or secondary to their criminality.
219
 
Reflecting on their experience, two professors of psychiatry have stated 
that  
the vast majority of the crimes committed by chronic mentally ill 
persons are misdemeanors . . . committed when the person is not in 
the psychotic phase of his or her illness. The behavior is usually 
goal-directed, such as wanting to acquire goods without paying for 
them, wanting to express anger, or wanting to go back to a 
psychiatric hospital.
220
  
Thus, while some criminal behavior may derive from mental illness, much 
may simply effectuate the goals of the individual.  
Building on the work of Virginia Aldigé Hiday,
221
 Professor William 
H. Fisher and his colleagues proposed a taxonomy of offenders with 
mental illnesses based on how their illnesses affect their criminal 
behavior.
222
 These authors suggest that one category of offenders with 
mental illnesses includes “individuals whose offenses could be seen as 
directly attributable to their mental illness, such as the individual with a 
psychotic disorder whose paranoid delusions lead [him] to commit acts of 
 
 
 217. See DAN A. LEWIS ET AL., WORLDS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 118–19 (1991); Wolff, Courts as 
Therapeutic Agents, supra note 20, at 432 (“Different factors motivate such persons to engage in 
criminal behavior, and only one of these factors is untreated mental illness.”). 
 218. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 217, at 118–19; Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra 
note 20, at 432; see also J. Draine et al., Role of Social Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and 
Homelessness Among Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 565, 565–67 
(2003) (observing that persons with mental illness may engage in offending because they are poor, not 
because they have a mental illness). 
 219. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 217, at 118–19; Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents, supra 
note 20, at 432. 
 220. Leonard I. Stein & Ronald J. Diamond, The Chronic Mentally Ill and the Criminal Justice 
System: When to Call the Police, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 271, 272 (1985). 
 221. See Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, in A HANDBOOK 
FOR THE STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH 508, 524–25 (Allen V. Horwitz & Teresa L. Scheid eds., 1999) 
(proposing the original taxonomy of offenders with mental illnesses). 
 222. See William H. Fisher et al., Community Mental Health Services and Criminal Justice 
Involvement Among Persons with Mental Illness, in COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS, supra note 
139, at 25, 43.  
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violence.”223 Researchers speculate that this cohort of offenders is small.224 
A second category of offenders with mental illnesses includes “individuals 
whose offenses could be characterized as indirectly attributable to their 
illness.”225 This group would include offenders whose mental illnesses 
contributed to their job loss, decline into poverty, and/or movement into 
environments rife with antisocial influences, all generic risk factors for 
criminal justice involvement.
226
 The offenses of these individuals will 
often include misdemeanor offenses and the manifestation of so-called 
“survival behavior.”227 A third category of offenders with mental illnesses, 
according to Professor Fisher and his colleagues, includes individuals with 
co-occurring character disorders and substance abuse, both of which are 
strong risk factors for offending, and those who have a long history of 
involvement with the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems.
228
 These 
researchers suggest that such individuals may have “more in common with 
other denizens of the county jail than with other clients of the mental 
health system.”229 Citing motor vehicle offenses like unlawfully attaching 
plates and serious charges like grand theft auto, drug trafficking, forgery, 
and passing bad checks, the authors opine that “[t]hese and other offenses 
fit neither the ‘misdemeanant’ nor the ‘deranged perpetrator of violence’ 
categories, but instead suggest criminal activity that may go forward 
independently or, indeed, in spite of the offenders’ mental illness.”230 
Recently, one set of social scientists has estimated the percentage of all 
offenders with mental illnesses whose criminal activity is attributable to 
their disorders. In an April 2010 article, Professor Jennifer L. Skeem and 
her colleagues hypothesized, based on their review of psychological 
literature, that mental illnesses may directly contribute to the criminality of 
only about 10 percent of the mentally disordered offending population.
231
 
They predict that, for the remaining 90 percent of offenders with mental 
illnesses, the effect of mental illness on criminal activity is fully mediated 
 
 
 223. Id. at 43. 
 224. See Hiday, supra note 221, at 525 (observing the existence of “a very small group” of 
seriously disordered individuals whose delusions lead them to commit violent crimes); Skeem, 
Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 117–19.  
 225. Fisher et al., supra note 222, at 43. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (stating that this category would correspond roughly to Hiday’s first category of “those 
committing misdemeanor offenses, some of which might not result in the arrest of a non-disordered 
person, and some which may involve so-called ‘survival behavior’”). 
 228. Id. at 43–44. 
 229. Id. at 44. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 118. 
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by factors such as poverty or social learning that similarly affect the 
general population.
232
 For the vast majority of offenders with mental 
illnesses, then, the correlation between their mental illnesses and criminal 
activity may be illusory.
233
  
Consequently, it appears illegitimate for mental health courts to 
assume, without case-specific evidence, that an offender’s crimes were 
driven by his mental illness. This holds important ramifications for the 
potential of therapeutic rehabilitative theory to justify mental health 
courts. Mental health courts are predicated on the belief that the provision 
of mental health services reduces social risk because symptomatic mental 
illnesses contribute to criminal behavior. If mental illness contributed to 
the criminal act that brought an offender within the jurisdiction of the 
court, as a matter of logic one may deduce that providing mental health 
treatment to that individual should reduce his likelihood of committing a 
similar act in the future.
234
 If an offender’s mental illness was unrelated to 
his predicate criminal act, however, then, for mental health courts to serve 
a rehabilitative function for that individual (and others like him), evidence 
should show that certain mental illnesses, as a general matter, are 
predictive of recidivism. The next section reviews available empirical 
evidence on the degree to which mental illnesses affect recidivism.  
2. Assumption that Symptomatic Mental Illness Directly Contributes to 
Recidivism 
A central and oft-expressed assumption of mental health courts is that 
mental illness drives the recidivism of individuals with mental illnesses. 
For instance, Probate Judge Jim Fuhrmeister, one of the founders of the 
Shelby County Mental Health Court in Alabama, has stated that, when an 
offender with mental illness does not receive treatment, “what happens is 
recidivism”—“[i]t just turns, basically, into a revolving door”—and that 
providing treatment should “lead to a turnaround in [participants’] 
lives.”235 Similarly, the judge of the mental health court in Jackson 
County, Michigan, has explained that mental health courts provide 
treatment to offenders with mental illnesses because “[t]hey’re just going 
 
 
 232. See id. at 116, 118. 
 233. See id. at 120 (emphasizing that “[e]ven among those with psychosis, symptoms directly 
cause crime for only a small fraction of offenders”). 
 234. See id. at 111, 120. 
 235. Amy Jones, County to Start Mental Health Court, SHELBY COUNTY REPORTER, June 24, 
2010, http://www.shelbycountyreporter.com/2010/06/24/county-to-start-mental-health-court/. 
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to recidivate if you don’t address the underlying pathology.”236 This 
sentiment has been repeated by mental health court judges across the 
country.
237
 
The prevalence of the belief that symptomatic mental illness fuels 
recidivism is understandable. Certainly, individuals with mental illnesses 
are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. A 2009 
study of more than 20,000 adults entering five local jails found serious 
mental illness in 14.5 percent of male and 31.0 percent of female 
inmates.
238
 These rates are three to six times higher than those found in the 
general population.
239
 The phenomenon of incarcerating individuals with 
mental illnesses has coincided with deinstitutionalization: according to Dr. 
Fuller Torrey of the National Institute of Mental Health, “approximately 
ninety-two percent of the people who would have been living in public 
psychiatric hospitals in 1955 were not living there in 1994.”240 Today, jails 
are the nation’s largest providers of mental health services.241 
 
 
 236. Chris Gautz, Mental-Health Court Celebrates Its First Anniversary, Honors First Two 
Graduates, JACKSON CITIZEN PATRIOT, Saturday Ed., Nov. 14, 2009, at A1, available at http://www 
.mlive.com/news/jackson/index.ssf/2009/11/mental-health_court_celebrates.html.  
 237. See, e.g., Brian Brueggemann, Mental Health Court to Open in October, BELLEVILLE NEWS 
DEMOCRAT, Aug. 24, 2006 (quoting Chief Judge Ann Callis as stating, “If we can identify people with 
mental illnesses when they first enter the criminal justice system and get them connected to a mental 
health program, we can help them manage their mental illness without further criminal activity in the 
future”); Hoover, supra note 178 (quoting Chief Judge Donald Hudson as stating that a key goal of the 
court is to “‘[stop] the revolving door’ of incarceration for people whose mental illness causes them to 
break laws or commit crimes”); HOPE Court Gives Offenders an Alternative to Jail Time, supra note 
181 (quoting Presiding Judge Eric D. Martin as stating that without treatment “many persons with 
mental illness churn through the system over and over” and that his “[c]ourt is designed to get at the 
genesis of these problems [in providing treatment], to break that cycle, [and] reduce the crime rate”); 
Kathleen Brady Shea, Mental Health Courts on Horizon: Local Counties Want to Steer Ill Defendants 
into Treatment Instead of Jail, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 30, 2008, at B1 (quoting Delaware County 
Court Judge Frank T. Hazel as expressing that offenders with mental illnesses often reoffend because 
they don’t receive adequate treatment for their mental illnesses); see also supra note 37. 
 238. Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 761, 764 (2009). This study has been touted as providing the “most reliable 
estimates of rates of serious mental illness for adults entering jails in the last 20 years.” COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., Council of State Governments Justice Center Releases Estimates on the 
Prevalence of Adults with Serious Mental Illnesses in Jails (June 1, 2009), available at http:// 
consensusproject.org/jc_publications/council-of-state-governments-justice-center-releases-estimates-on-
the-prevalence-of-adults-with-serious-mental-illnesses-in-jails/MH_Prevalence_Study_brief_final.pdf. 
 239. R.C. Kessler et al., The Epidemiology of Co-Occurring Addictive and Mental Disorders: 
Implications for Prevention and Service Utilization, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 17–31 (1996) 
(estimating that 5.4 percent of individuals in the United States have a serious mental illness). 
 240. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 
8–9 (1997). 
 241. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, Note, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 971, 978 (2006) (observing that, “in 1992, the Los Angeles County jail became the 
nation’s largest mental institution, with Cook County Jail, Illinois, and Riker’s Island, New York, as 
second and third respectively”). 
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In 1972, Marc F. Abramson offered a theory—coined 
“criminalization”—to explain the disproportionate involvement of 
individuals with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system.
242
 The 
criminalization theory is premised on the belief that persons with mental 
illnesses become inappropriately involved with the criminal justice system 
because of failed mental health policy and service delivery.
243
 In 
particular, Dr. Abramson argued that law enforcement will arrest 
individuals with mental illnesses for their disordered behavior partially as 
a means to compensate for the limited ability of the civil commitment 
system to detain them involuntarily.
244
 While the criminalization theory 
was developed in response to heightened standards for civil commitment, 
some believe his hypothesis holds even greater promise for predicting the 
likely consequences of deinstitutionalization in the context of few 
community treatment options.
245
 According to adherents of the 
criminalization theory, the criminal behavior of individuals with mental 
illnesses is a product of inadequate mental health services and the 
expression of psychiatric symptoms.
246
 Adequate mental health treatment, 
then, should reduce the recidivism of these individuals.
247
 Recently, 
psychology and criminology scholars have pointed to a dearth of evidence 
 
 
 242. Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-
Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101, 103 (1972). 
 243. Fisher, Silver & Wolff, supra note 126, at 546. 
 244. See Abramson, supra note 242, at 103. 
 245. See Fisher, Silver & Wolff, supra note 126, at 546 (“Mentally ill offenders are often arrested 
because jails lack adequate procedures to divert them into community-based treatment programs.” 
(quoting SOROS FOUND., RESEARCH BRIEF, MENTAL ILLNESS IN U.S. JAILS: DIVERTING THE NON-
VIOLENT, LOW-LEVEL OFFENDER 2 (1996))); Carole Morgan, Developing Mental Health Services for 
Local Jails, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 259, 261 (1981) (“A substantial number of the individuals 
currently warehoused in jails are those ‘forfeited’ patients who were previously institutionalized in 
psychiatric hospitals. It would seem that the social control of these ‘deviants’ has shifted from the 
mental health to the criminal justice system.”). 
 246. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 23, at 143 (“For most [offenders with mental illnesses], 
the underlying issue is their need for basic services and supports that public systems have failed to 
deliver in meaningful ways.”); H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental 
Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 485 (1998) (“[M]any uncared-
for mentally ill persons may be arrested for minor criminal acts that are really manifestations of their 
illness, their lack of treatment, and the lack of structure in their lives.”); see also John Junginger et al., 
Effects of Serious Mental Illness and Substance Abuse on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 879, 879 (2006) (explaining that adherents of the criminalization theory apparently believe 
that “symptoms of serious mental illness motivate or otherwise cause actual criminal offenses”). 
 247. See Fisher, Silver & Wolff, supra note 126, at 546; Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 246, at 
490. 
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that supports the criminalization hypothesis,
248
 but others continue to 
ascribe to this theory.
249
 
Despite the popularity and current cache of the criminalization theory, 
no research exists demonstrating that mental illness is a principal or 
proximate cause of criminal behavior for most offenders with mental 
illnesses.
250
 Instead, the preponderance of scientific evidence indicates 
that, while offenders with mental illnesses may be at an elevated risk for 
reoffending (an issue of correlation),
251
 their disorders typically do not 
directly contribute to their re-arrest (an issue of causation).
252
 For the vast 
majority of offenders with mental illnesses, criminal behavior actually 
appears to be motivated by the same risk factors—such as substance 
abuse, procriminal attitudes, criminal associates, and unstable lifestyle—
that motivate nondisordered offenders.
253
  
a. Trivial Role of Mental Illness in Recidivism  
For much of the twentieth century, researchers’ attention was focused 
on the relationship between mental illness and violence.
254
 While some 
studies found that individuals with mental illnesses are no more likely to 
 
 
 248. See, e.g., Fisher, Silver & Wolff, supra note 126, at 547–48 (marshalling evidence in support 
of, and challenging, the criminalization theory and concluding that the body of evidence is “at best 
equivocal in its support of the ‘criminalization due to inadequate mental health services’ model); John 
Junginger et al., supra note 246, at 879 (“In fact, what little empirical research exists on this particular 
interpretation of the criminalization hypothesis has produced no consensus.”); Skeem, Manchak & 
Peterson, supra note 15, at 116 (“There is no evidence for the basic criminalization premise that 
decreased psychiatric services explain the disproportionate risk of incarceration for individuals with 
mental illness.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Keele, supra note 182, at 194–95 (2002); Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of 
Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered 
Persons, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1169, 1183 (1997); Marlee E. Moore & Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Mental 
Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison of Re-Arrest and Re-Arrest Severity Between Mental Health 
Court and Traditional Court Participants, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2006). 
 250. Wolff, Courting the Court, supra note 139, at 155, 163. 
 251. See, e.g., A. Murray Ferguson, James R.P. Ogloff & Lindsay Thomson, Predicting 
Recidivism by Mentally Disordered Offenders Using the LSI-R:SV, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5, 5 
(2009) (listing studies showing that individuals with major mental disorder are at an “elevated risk” for 
engaging in criminal behavior compared to members of the general population); Eric Silver, 
Understanding the Relationship Between Mental Disorder and Violence: The Need for a 
Criminological Perspective, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 685, 685–86 (2006) (listing studies and 
concluding that risk of violence is “modestly elevated” for persons with mental illness, particularly 
when paired with substance abuse).  
 252. See infra notes 274–79. 
 253. See infra notes 291–99. 
 254. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 217, at 110; Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People 
Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393, 401 nn.1–2 (1998). 
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be violent than their non-ill neighbors,
255
 others have indicated that mental 
illness is a modest risk factor for violence,
256
 especially for individuals 
experiencing psychotic symptoms
257
 and co-occurring substance abuse.
258
 
 
 
 255. See, e.g., Rani A. Desai, Jail Diversion Services for People with Mental Illness: What Do We 
Really Know?, in COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS, supra note 139, at 99, 102 (listing studies); 
Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 612 & n.188 
(2003) (same). 
 256. See, e.g., John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 7-2.2.1, at 314 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997) (“Mental disorder may be a 
statistically significant risk factor for the occurrence of violence.”); John Monahan & Jean Arnold, 
Violence by People with Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates and Researchers, 19 
PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 67, 70 (1996) (“The results of several recent large-scale projects 
conclude that only a weak association between mental disorders and violence exists in the 
community.”); Edward P. Mulvey & Jess Fardella, Are The Mentally Ill Really Violent?, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 39 (“[R]ecently, . . . researchers . . . have concluded that there is a 
statistically significant association between mental illness and violence: Overall, the mentally ill are 
more likely to act out violently than the general public. However, this association is not very 
strong. . . . Also, the manner in which mental illness contributes to violence, when it does, varies 
considerably and is often far from clear.”); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 24 
n.20, 40, 82 (2000) (discussing evidence regarding the relationship between mental illness and 
violence).  
 257. A 2009 meta-analysis of 204 studies and samples found a small correlation between 
psychosis and violence. See Kevin S. Douglas, Laura S. Guy & Stephen D. Hart, Psychosis as a Risk 
Factor for Violence to Others: A Meta-Analysis, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 679, 688 (2009) (discussed in 
Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 117). The study authors found no meaningful 
correlation, however, between psychosis and violence for offenders with mental illness or for general 
offenders. See Douglas, Guy & Hart, supra, at 688. Other studies have found a more robust 
correlation. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Alternative Pathways to Violence in Persons with 
Schizophrenia: The Role of Childhood Antisocial Behavior Problems, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 228, 
235, 237 (2008) (finding a relationship between positive psychotic symptoms, such as persecutory 
ideation, and serious violence in schizophrenic patients not also manifesting childhood conduct 
problems); Bruce G. Link, Howard Andrews & Francis T. Cullen, The Violent and Illegal Behavior of 
Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275, 286–88 (1992) (finding higher rates of 
violence—measured by arrests and self-reports—in a sample of mental patients than in residents who 
had never received psychiatric treatment, after controlling for socio-demographic and community 
context variables, and finding that this association was partially accounted for by the presence of 
current psychotic symptoms); see also Junginger et al., supra note 246, at 881 (highlighting a small 
proportion of offenders whose violent criminal acts appeared directly or indirectly related to 
delusions). But see Paul Appelbaum, Pamela Clark Robbins & John Monahan, Violence and 
Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 
571 (2000) (finding that delusions are not associated with a higher risk of violent behavior). For a 
recent summary of the literature examining the relationship between psychotic symptoms and 
violence, see Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L. Skeem, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific 
About Being Dynamic, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 347, 362 (2005).  
 258. The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, perhaps the most authoritative analysis of 
the relationship between violence and mental illness, found the prevalence of violence of patients 
discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities, so long as they did not exhibit symptoms of 
substance abuse, was statistically indistinguishable from that of non-substance-abusing residents in the 
same neighborhoods. See Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged, supra note 254, at 400. 
However, among those individuals who reported symptoms of substance abuse, patients were more 
likely to be violent than their substance-abusing neighbors. Id. For a more recent discussion on the 
relationship of mental illness, substance abuse, and violence, see Mulvey & Fardella, supra note 256, 
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This caveat is not trivial: individuals with mental illnesses 
disproportionately abuse alcohol and drugs,
259
 perhaps as a way to manage 
their symptoms. A substantial body of evidence establishes, however, that 
any independent contribution made by mental illness to violence pales in 
comparison to risk factors shared by the general population such as sex, 
age, and educational achievement.
260
  
Research on mental illness and violence suggests that, consistent with 
Professors Skeem’s and Fisher’s analyses,261 mental illness may play a 
direct role in the criminality of a minority of individuals, particularly those 
experiencing positive psychotic symptoms or engaging in substance abuse. 
If this relationship holds, treating the mental illnesses (and any co-
occurring substance abuse) of these individuals may be effective in 
reducing recidivism.
262
 However, mental health courts are largely beyond 
the reach of individuals with mental illnesses who commit violent acts. 
Most mental health courts exclude persons with a history of violence or 
who are otherwise determined to be a public safety threat.
263
 So, while 
mental illness may be a causal factor for some violent crimes, mental 
health courts are unlikely to provide treatment in those situations. 
More recently, psychologists and other social scientists have looked 
beyond violence to explore the relationship between mental illness and 
crime.
264
 This area of research is challenging for a number of reasons.
265
 
 
 
at 50 (“New research . . . suggests that individuals who have less serious forms of mental illness but 
who engage in substance abuse have the highest risk for violence among the mentally ill. People with 
more severe mental disorders but no substance abuse problems, however, are no more likely to be 
violent than their ‘normal’ neighbors.”). 
 259. See Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged, supra note 254, at 400; E. Fuller Torrey 
et al., The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study Revisited: Two Views Ten Years After Its Initial 
Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 147, 149 (2008) (“Mental disorder has a significant effect on 
violence by increasing people’s susceptibility to substance abuse.”). 
 260. See, e.g., Link & Stueve, supra note 52, at 179; Link, Andrews & Cullen, supra note 257, at 
290; Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 116–17. 
 261. See supra notes 222–33. 
 262. See Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 119.  
 263. See Redlich et al., Second Generation, supra note 4, at 534 (observing that newer mental 
health courts may be more tolerant of violent offenders but still consider public safety in a “‘totality of 
the circumstances’ approach”); Nancy Wolff, Courting the Court, supra note 139, at 166 (“Mental 
health courts as they are currently formulated accept only the good risks. Cases are limited to those 
where the crimes are minor and the risk of violence minimal. This selection rule is . . . driven strictly 
by political exigencies. . . . Mental health court judges know that if someone under supervision 
commits a violent crime, their court will be closed down.”); id. at 167 (noting that “[m]ental health 
courts avoid cases [involving] previous charges of violence”). In addition, the insanity defense may be 
applicable to the subset of offenders whose actions were the product of delusions. See id. at 175.  
 264. These researchers, building off of seminal work by D.A. Andrews and James Bonta, include 
Jennifer L. Skeem, William H. Fisher, Jeffrey Draine, and Nancy Wolff.  
 265. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in elucidating the relationship between mental 
illness and criminal activity, see Desai, supra note 255, at 101. 
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First, individuals with mental illnesses commit a wide array of crimes. 
Contrary to the stereotype underlying the criminalization theory of an 
offender with mental illness as a petty misdemeanant,
266
 individuals with 
mental illnesses commit misdemeanors, felonies, and violent felonies.
267
 
Indeed, a recent study of the offending patterns of 13,816 individuals with 
severe mental illnesses over a ten-year period found that such individuals 
were arrested for serious violent crimes, such as nonnegligent homicide or 
aggravated battery, nearly as often as for crimes against the public 
order.
268
 Mental health courts, reflecting this reality, are increasingly 
expansive in the criminal acts they allow,
269
 making it harder to make 
meaningful generalizations about the criminal activity of eligible 
offenders. 
Other complexities exist as well. For instance, the contribution of 
mental illness to an individual’s likelihood of reoffending, as with 
violence, will vary with the type of mental illness that he has and the ebb 
and flow of his symptoms. In addition, a number of variables may modify 
or confound the effect of mental illness on criminal activity, such as 
history of trauma, poverty, antisocial cognitions, or substance abuse.
270
 
These variables may exist independent of an individual’s mental illness or 
may be a partial product of his illness. Finally, as proponents of 
criminalization have observed, individuals with mental illnesses may be 
arrested at a higher rate than non-ill individuals who behave in a similar 
 
 
 266. See Fisher et al., supra note 222, at 42 (recognizing a “criminalization stereotype” of 
offenders with mental illnesses as committing low-level misdemeanors as a result of receiving 
inadequate mental health services); Lynette Feder, A Comparison of the Community Adjustment of 
Mentally Ill Offenders with Those from the General Prison Population: An 18-Month Followup, 15(5) 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 487 (1991) (“[S]ome researchers have argued that deinstitutionalization 
had led to the criminalization of the mentally ill. This leads to the implicit assumption that this group 
will be comprised of less serious offenders than those found in the general prison population.”). 
 267. See William H. Fisher et al., Categorizing Temporal Patterns of Arrest in a Cohort of Adults 
with Serious Mental Illness, 37 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 477 (2010); William H. Fisher et 
al., Patterns and Prevalence of Arrest in a Statewide Cohort of Mental Health Care Consumers, 57 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1623, 1625 (2006) (Table 2). 
 268. See Fisher et al., Patterns and Prevalence, supra note 267, at 1625 (Table 2). Specifically, 
16.1 percent of cohort members were charged with crimes against public order, defined as “[b]eing a 
disorderly person, disturbing the peace, setting a false alarm, instigating a bomb hoax, trespassing, and 
consuming alcohol in a public place in violation of [an] open-container law.” Id. at 1625–26. On the 
other hand, 13.6 percent of cohort members were charged with serious violence against persons, 
defined to include “[m]urder; nonnegligent manslaughter; forcible rape; robbery (including armed 
robbery); aggravated assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, against a person over age 65, 
against a disabled person, and to collect a debt.” Id. In the aggregate, 27.9 percent of cohort members 
were charged with any offense over the ten-year period. Id. at 1625 (Table 2). 
 269. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 7–9. 
 270. See Desai, supra note 255, at 101.  
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manner, either because they are targeted by law enforcement
271
 or because 
they have a decreased ability to avoid detection.
272
 In summary, the 
likelihood that mental illness may contribute to an individual’s recidivism 
may depend upon the nature of his crimes, his diagnosis, the course of his 
symptoms, his characteristics and circumstances, and the degree to which 
law enforcement selectively targets individuals with mental illnesses in his 
community.  
Despite these complexities, a growing body of evidence suggests that 
the types of mental illnesses targeted by many mental health courts—
severe mental illness or Axis I disorders
273—are insignificant predictors of 
criminal behavior for most offenders. A landmark 1998 meta-analysis 
conducted by James Bonta, Professor Moira Law, and Karl Hanson found 
that the effect of clinical variables—such as diagnosis, intellectual 
dysfunction, and treatment history
274—on recidivism275 was largely 
insignificant and paled in comparison to dozens of other factors.
276
 The 
meta-analysis of fifty-eight studies dated between 1959 and 1995 revealed 
that intellectual dysfunction, diagnosis of a mood disorder, and treatment 
history were nonsignificant variables, while psychosis and schizophrenia 
were negatively related to recidivism.
277
 The study’s authors concluded 
that many of the clinical factors emphasized within the mental health 
community “have little relevance to the assessment of long-term risk for 
recidivism.”278 Subsequent studies have confirmed the negligible role that 
major mental illness seems to play in recidivism.
279
 
 
 
 271. See Mark R. Pogrebin & Eric D. Poole, Deinstitutionalization and Increased Arrest Rates 
Among the Mentally Disordered, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 117, 118–19 (1987); Linda Teplin, 
Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 798 (1984) (presenting data from 1,382 police-citizen encounters to show law 
enforcement’s response to individuals with mental illnesses). 
 272. See Desai, supra note 255, at 101.  
 273. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
 274. James Bonta, Moira Law & Karl Hanson, The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism 
Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 125 (1998). 
 275. Recidivism was defined as including “any evidence of a new criminal offense” (like an arrest 
or conviction), “including a recommitment to a psychiatric hospital because of law-breaking 
behavior.” Id. at 125–26.  
 276. See id. at 127–28 (general recidivism); id. at 132 (violent recidivism).  
 277. Id. at 128, 132, 136. These researchers found that major mental disorder was at least 
unrelated to violent and nonviolent recidivism and, in some cases, may have even been negatively 
associated with reoffending. See id. at 135, 136, 139. 
 278. Id. at 135; see also id. at 137 (“Clinical variables and clinical judgments contribute 
minimally in the prediction of recidivism.”). 
 279. See Feder, supra note 266, at 485–86, 488 (finding, in a study of the postprison adjustment 
patterns of 147 offenders with mental illnesses and 400 non-ill offenders, that psychiatric variables 
(number of criminal hospitalizations, number of civil hospitalizations, age at first hospitalization) were 
not significant in predicting recidivism among offenders with mental illnesses); Paul Gendreau, Tracy 
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One type of mental disorder that would not satisfy the eligibility 
criteria of most mental health courts
280—antisocial personality disorder—
 
 
Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 
34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 589 (1996) (finding, in a meta-analysis of 131 studies with 1,141 effect sizes, 
that psychiatric symptomology did not correlate with recidivism); see also Kevin M. Cremin et al., 
Ensuring a Fair Hearing for Litigants with Mental Illnesses: The Law and Psychology of Capacity, 
Admissibility, and Credibility Assessments in Civil Proceedings, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 455, 481 (2009) 
(“[I]ndividuals having a primary psychiatric diagnosis alone (i.e., a mood, anxiety or psychotic 
disorder) are not more likely to exhibit psychopathic or antisocial behavior than those who have not 
been so diagnosed.”); Jeffrey Draine, Where is the ‘Illness’ in the Criminalization of Mental Illness?, 
in COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS, supra note 139, at 16–18 (reviewing relevant literature and 
concluding that, although representing a limited empirical base, studies to date do not demonstrate that 
mental illness plays an important role in reoffending); Wolff, Courting the Court, supra note 139, at 
156 (“The preponderance of evidence shows that there is no reliable or predictive connection between 
mental illness and crime.”). 
 280. See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that most mental health courts require a 
diagnosis of an Axis I disorder, but many also accept individuals who have a co-occurring Axis II 
disorder); Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 205 (reporting that only 3 percent of mental health 
courts in a national survey allowed defendants with an Axis II diagnosis to participate).  
 There are many good reasons to support mental health courts’ decision not to allow a primary 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder to establish eligibility. First, criminal law generally does 
not recognize antisocial personality disorder as reducing culpability. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The 
Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 843 (2009) (“Those diagnosed with [antisocial personality disorder] or 
psychopathy ‘may have problems fully appreciating the emotional meaning or consequences of their 
actions and using their emotions to make choices and plans,’ but the law considers that ‘they ought to 
know better than to commit serious crime and violence.’ Those with this diagnosis who commit 
heinous murders thus are worthy of retribution, and their conduct is sufficiently voluntary that it is 
subject to deterrence.” (quoting Stephen D. Hart, Psychopathy, Culpability, and Commitment, in 
MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 159, 169 (Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009)); Stephen J. 
Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1637 (1994) (commenting on the complex 
challenge psychopaths present for issues of culpability, observing that a “psychopath knows what he is 
up to, what the rules are, and what will happen to him if he is caught for breaking them,” id. at 1636, 
and seeming to indicate that the proper moral response is to hold psychopaths responsible for their 
behavior); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (arguably precluding psychopaths from pleading 
the insanity defense by stating that “the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct”). Indeed, some of the most 
heinous criminals likely carry this diagnosis. See Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence, supra, at 840–41 (observing that Ted Bundy, Adolf Hitler, and Saddam 
Hussein probably had antisocial personality disorder); see also Grant T. Harris, Tracey A. Skilling & 
Marnie E. Rice, The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 198 (2001) (“[M]any of the 
most serious and persistent offenders would be identified as psychopathic.”). Second, allowing a 
primary diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder to establish eligibility for diversion to a mental 
health court would eliminate a key limiting function of the mental illness eligibility criterion. Some 
studies have found that over half—and perhaps as many as 90 percent of incarcerated criminals—
could carry this diagnosis. See Paul Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 234 (1999) (“[A]ntisocial personality disorder 
is extremely common in prisons with prevalence rates as high as 40–60% among the male sentenced 
population.”); Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan & Edward P. Mulvey, Psychopathy, Treatment 
Involvement, and Subsequent Violence Among Civil Psychiatric Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
577, 578 (2002) (indicating that up to 90 percent of offenders likely qualify for an antisocial 
personality disorder diagnosis). Finally, some evidence suggests that antisocial personality disorder 
may be less amenable to treatment than Axis I disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or 
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likely contributes to recidivism.
281
 Antisocial personality disorder is an 
Axis II disorder whose symptoms are behavioral rather than associated 
with cognitive impairment.
282
 This personality disorder is defined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as “a pervasive 
pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.”283 Studies 
indicate that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder correlates with 
violence and criminal activity.
284
 Reflecting the fact that one criterion of 
the disorder is that individuals “fail to conform to social norms with 
respect to lawful behaviors” as indicated by “repeatedly perform[ing] acts 
that are ground for arrest,”285 some research has suggested that the 
predictive power of a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder for 
recidivism is fully mediated by an individual’s past antisocial or criminal 
acts as well as by socio-demographic risk factors.
286
 The weight of recent 
 
 
depression. See, e.g., James R. P. Ogloff, Stephen Wong & Anthony Greenwood, Treating Criminal 
Psychopaths in a Therapeutic Community Program, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 181, 186 (1990) 
(“Psychopaths tend to show less clinical improvement, they are less motivated in trying to change their 
behaviors and they have a higher attrition rate [in treatment programs].”). But see Randall T. Salekin, 
Psychopathy and Therapeutic Pessimism: Clinical Lore or Clinical Reality?, 22 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
REV. 79, 105 (2002) (conducting a meta-analysis of forty-two studies and concluding that “there is 
little scientific support” for the belief that psychopaths are untreatable); Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, 
supra, at 594 (“Patients with psychopathic traits appeared as likely to benefit from adequate doses of 
treatment by becoming less violent as those without such traits.”).  
 281. For a synopsis of evidence regarding the relationship between antisocial personality disorder, 
psychopathy, violence, and recidivism, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEM 481–82 (5th ed. 2009). The terms antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy 
are sometimes used interchangeably in psychological literature, but an individual may be considered a 
“psychopath” based on assessment tools such as the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL or PCL-R) but not 
actually be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder in a clinical sense. See Morse, Culpability 
and Control, supra note 280, at 1635 n.133; Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, supra note 280, at 826 n.296, 840–43 (defining and distinguishing antisocial 
personality disorder from psychopathy). 
 282. See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Are There Ethnic Differences in Levels of Psychopathy? A 
Meta-Analysis, 28(5) LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 505, 505 (2004) (“Psychopathy represents a constellation 
of affective, interpersonal, and behavioral features . . . .”); Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, supra note 280, at 826 n.296 (“As defined in the DSM-IV-TR, 
[antisocial personality disorder] is exclusively behavioral in nature, involving certain behavioral 
manifestations and personality traits.”).  
 283. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 191, at 701. 
 284. See, e.g., Grant T. Harris, Marnie E. Rice & Catherine A. Cormier, Psychopathy and Violent 
Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 634 (1991) (finding that those offenders who were also 
psychopaths “exhibited much higher rates of violent recidivism than those who were not” in an 
empirical study); Robert D. Hare & Leslie M. McPherson, Violent and Aggressive Behavior by 
Criminal Psychopaths, 7 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 35, 43 (1984) (“[T]here is a strong and consistent 
relationship between the assessment of psychopathy and various indices of violence.”); Moran, supra 
note 280, at 238 (“[A]ntisocial personality disorder has . . . been found to be strongly associated with 
crime, and in particular, violent crime.” (citations omitted)). 
 285. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 191, at 706.  
 286. See Marnie E. Rice et al., Recidivism Among Male Insanity Acquittees, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 379, 380–81 (1990) (“The finding that antisocial personality disorder is related to recidivism is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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research, however, demonstrates that behavioral traits associated with 
antisocial personality disorder are indicators of risk.
287
 Along these lines, 
Bonta and Professor D.A. Andrews have identified major mental disorder 
as a “minor” risk factor288 but posit that its predictive validity is mediated 
by the general risk factors of antisocial cognition and antisocial 
personality pattern, as well as substance abuse.
289
  
Indeed, antisocial cognition and behavior are highly correlated with 
recidivism for both mentally disordered and nondisordered offenders. 
Bonta and Andrews, drawing upon social psychological models of 
criminality and social learning theory,
290
 have codified an influential list of 
major criminogenic need factors—dynamic risk factors that, when 
changed, are associated with changes in recidivism
291—coined the “Big 
 
 
problematic, because criminal behavior is one of the symptoms of the disorder; therefore it is unclear 
. . . whether diagnosis contributes anything more to the prediction of recidivism than does criminal 
history alone.”); Zach Walsh & David S. Kosson, Psychopathy and Violent Crime: A Prospective 
Study of the Influence of Socioeconomic Status and Ethnicity, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 224 
(2007) (reporting that socio-demographic variables have a moderating impact on the relationship 
between psychopathy and violent crime). While the 1998 meta-analysis conducted by Bonta, Law, and 
Hanson found that antisocial personality disorder was a significant clinical predictor for both general 
and violent recidivism, Bonta, Law & Hanson, supra note 274, at 128, 132, the researchers stressed 
that the extent to which the noncriminal aspects of this disorder may contribute to criminal risk 
assessment is unclear, id. at 138 (“Whether the noncriminal aspects of antisocial personality disorder 
significantly contribute to criminal risk assessment remains an open question . . . .”).  
 287. See John F. Edens, John Petrila & Jacqueline K. Buffington-Vollum, Psychopathy and the 
Death Penalty: Can the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders Who Represent ‘A 
Continuing Threat to Society’?, 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 434 (2001) (“[I]n many of the samples 
and settings in which it has been investigated, the presence of psychopathic traits . . . indicates an 
increased tendency toward violent and other criminal behavior.”); Skeem et al., supra note 282, at 505 
(“Those high in psychopathic traits . . . . appear to be at risk for community violence, general and 
violent criminal recidivism, institutional adjustment problems, and slow treatment response.”). 
 288. D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & J. Stephen Wormith, The Recent Past and Near Future of 
Risk and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 11 (2006).  
 289. Id. at 10 (stating, “the predictive validity of mental disorder [for criminal justice 
involvement] most likely reflects antisocial cognition, antisocial personality pattern, and substance 
abuse”). 
 290. Social psychological theories of criminality posit that, to reduce recidivism, programs should 
target needs closely related to criminality, such as antisocial attitudes, criminal associates, and unstable 
lifestyle. D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 296–97 (2d ed. 
1998) (exploring social psychological theories of criminality and implications for treatment); Bonta, 
Law & Hanson, supra note 274, at 138. A key component of social psychological theories of 
criminality is social learning, a theory holding that criminal behavior is largely learned through early 
modeling and reinforcement patterns. See Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 116; see also 
Silver, supra note 251, at 691–92 (describing social learning theory in the context of violence). 
Explanatory elements of social learning theory include differential association (group influence on 
behavior), definitions (an individual’s attitudes and beliefs, learned and reinforced through differential 
association), differential reinforcement (the balance of actual and anticipated consequences for 
engaging in criminal behavior), and imitation or modeling (learning by observing others). Id. at 691.  
 291. Bonta, Law & Hanson, supra note 274, at 138. There are two types of risk factors: static and 
dynamic. Static risk factors are historical markers that are unchangeable and related to criminal 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
572 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:519 
 
 
 
 
Four” and “Central Eight.”292 These factors appear to affect recidivism 
among disordered and nondisordered offenders alike.
293
 The Big Four 
risk/need factors, which have the greatest ability to predict criminal 
behavior,
294
 include a history of antisocial behavior, antisocial personality 
pattern, antisocial cognition,
295
 and antisocial attitudes
296—all aspects of 
antisocial personality disorder. These variables involve poor socialization, 
restless energy, risk-taking, impulsivity, egocentrism, poor problem-
solving skills, hostility, and a disregard for responsibilities and others.
297
 
The four additional risk/need factors that comprise the Central Eight, 
which are moderately correlated with recidivism, include family and/or 
marital problems, low levels of social and/or work performance, low 
levels of involvement and satisfaction in anticriminal leisure pursuits, and 
substance abuse.
298
 Subsequent studies, including large-scale meta-
analyses, have confirmed the importance of criminogenic risk factors in 
predicting recidivism.
299
  
While major mental illness may not be a causal factor in the criminal 
behavior of most offenders with mental illnesses, mental illness may play 
an indirect role in generating socio-demographic conditions linked with 
 
 
offending. See Ferguson, Ogloff & Thomson, supra note 251, at 7. Static risk factors proven to be 
modestly correlated with recidivism include past criminal history, family structure, history of juvenile 
delinquency, age, and gender. Id. at 7.  
 292. Andrews, Bonta & Wormith, supra note 288, at 10, 11; see also ANDREWS & BONTA, supra 
note 290, at 296–97.  
 293. See Andrews, Bonta & Wormith, supra note 288, at 11, 16.  
 294. CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. & CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF: 
CRIMINAL THINKING: DO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES THINK DIFFERENTLY? 2 (2010), available 
at http://cbhs.rutgers.edu/pdfs/Policy_Brief_April_2010.pdf.  
 295. Recent research on antisocial cognition has found that offenders with mental illnesses exhibit 
criminal thinking patterns and content comparable to non-ill inmates. See Robert D. Morgan et al., 
Prevalence of Criminal Thinking Among State Prison Inmates with Serious Mental Illness, 34 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 324, 332 (2010). This research supports the theory that offenders with mental illnesses 
possess characteristics that predispose them to criminal behaviors that co-occur with, but are largely 
independent of, their mental illnesses. Id. at 334. 
 296. Andrews, Bonta & Wormith, supra note 288, at 11. 
 297. See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 290, at 356. 
 298. Andrews, Bonta & Wormith, supra note 288, at 11.  
 299. See D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 
2006) (a quantitative study of eight meta-analyses demonstrating the importance of criminogenic risk 
factors to recidivism); Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and Violent 
Reoffending: A Meta-Analysis, 42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 451–53, 459–60 (2000) (a meta-
analysis finding strong support for the categorization of criminogenic and noncriminogenic needs and 
concluding that programs targeting criminogenic needs produced greater treatment effects than those 
that did not); Gendreau, Little & Goggin, supra note 279, at 582, 588 (a meta-analytic study finding 
that criminogenic needs are significant and potent predictors of recidivism); see also D.A. Andrews & 
James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 
(2010) (summarizing the empirical base for programs that decrease recidivism by targeting 
criminogenic needs). 
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criminal activity.
300
 Mental illness may contribute, for instance, to a loss of 
employment, movement into disadvantaged neighborhoods, gain of 
antisocial acquaintances, and loss of prosocial support—all criminogenic 
risk factors that heighten risk of criminality.
301
 Offenders with mental 
illnesses are also more prone to homelessness and substance abuse, two 
factors highly correlated with recidivism.
302
 Evidence suggests that 
individuals with mental illnesses may also enjoy fewer social supports 
than non-ill individuals.
303
 Indeed, some research suggests that offenders 
with mental illnesses may enter the criminal justice system with a higher 
concentration of criminogenic risk factors, on average, than non-ill 
offenders.
304
  
Consistent with research showing that mental illness is not a dynamic 
risk factor for reoffending, evidence shows that the provision of mental 
health treatment alone is not an effective strategy for reducing the 
recidivism of offenders with mental illnesses.
305
 Studies have found that 
 
 
 300. See Draine et al., supra note 218 (arguing that poverty moderates the relationship between 
serious mental illness and criminal behavior).  
 301. See Fisher et al., Community Mental Health Services, supra note 222, at 38 (“[A] conceptual 
model . . . would see severe mental illness as generating a set of social and economic statuses which in 
turn place individuals with those illnesses at risk for criminal justice involvement. Indeed, they 
experience the same kind of risk encountered by others of similar socioeconomic status who do not 
have serious mental illness.”). 
 302. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 36, at 57; Jeffrey Draine, Mental or Criminal?, 356 
LANCET s48 (2000); see also Fred C. Osher & Henry J. Steadman, Adapting Evidence-Based Practices 
for Persons with Mental Illness Involved with the Criminal Justice System, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 
1472, 1473 (2007) (“In jails 30.3% of inmates with mental illnesses were homeless in the year before 
arrest, compared with 17.3% of other inmates. Not having a home upon release from jail or prison also 
increases the risk of rearrest.”). 
 303. See Feder, supra note 266, at 483 (“Regardless of whether the [mentally ill offenders] were 
released from the prison or from the hospital, they were significantly less likely . . . to receive support 
from family or friends upon release into the community (56% vs. 80% for those in the general prison 
population.”)). 
 304. See Draine, Mental or Criminal?, supra note 302; Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 
15, at 117 (discussing studies and suggesting that “offenders [with mental illnesses] are at risk not 
because they are mentally ill, but because they disproportionately experience key factors (e.g., 
antisocial pattern) that proponents [of the social/personality theory] believe establish and maintain 
ongoing criminal activity”). William H. Fisher, Eric Silver, and Nancy Wolff have identified some of 
the ways in which offenders with mental illnesses might develop a greater constellation of 
criminogenic risk factors than nondisordered individuals. See Fisher, Silver & Wolff, supra note 126, 
at 551–54; see also Fisher et al., Community Mental Health Services, supra note 222, at 38–41 
(exploring the role of poverty and social environments as risk factors for criminal justice involvement 
among persons with mental illness). 
 305. See Morgan et al., supra note 295, at 334 (“Intensive, targeted treatment and service delivery 
approaches have not proven to be sufficiently preventive, nor has psychiatric treatment by itself.”); 
Fisher et al., Community Mental Health Services, supra note 222, at 37 (discussing a series of findings 
suggesting “that ‘generic’ community mental health services of the kind provided to persons with 
severe mental illness, while providing important treatment and support services, may not in and of 
themselves reduce the risk of criminal justice involvement or re-involvement for some individuals in 
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providing intensive mental health services, and not addressing broader 
criminogenic needs, does not reduce rates of criminal behavior for 
individuals with mental illnesses.
306
 Even evidence-based mental health 
services—those proven to have a reliable effect on clinical outcomes—
have not reduced recidivism in programs designed to decrease the 
involvement of individuals with mental illnesses in the criminal justice 
system.
307
 Such findings prompted Professor Skeem and her colleagues to 
report that “no evidence” supports the assumption that the control or 
reduction of mental illness symptoms will reduce recidivism.
308
  
Studies show that the most effective programs for reducing recidivism 
are those that target the specific risks and needs predictive of criminality, 
such as procriminal attitudes, criminal associates, and substance abuse.
309
 
One researcher recently concluded that clear empirical evidence 
demonstrates that appropriate offender rehabilitation programs addressing 
criminogenic variables can reduce recidivism by 30 percent.
310
 In light of 
this evidence, Bonta and Andrews have issued this opinion:  
 
 
this population”); Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 120 (explaining that “even if mental 
illness contributed to downward socioeconomic drift, it is unlikely that symptom improvement will 
reverse poverty or associated criminogenic factors that are more socioeconomic than medical” and that 
“factors that originally caused criminal behavior may differ from those that maintain it”).  
 306. See, e.g., Robin E. Clark, Susan K. Rickets & Gregory J. McHugo, Legal System Involvement 
and Costs for Persons in Treatment for Severe Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders, 50(5) 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 641, 644 (1999) (finding that arrest rates of participants in assertive 
community treatment and those in standard case management did not differ significantly); Jennifer L. 
Skeem & Jennifer Eno Louden, Toward Evidence-Based Practice for Probationers and Parolees 
Mandated to Mental Health Treatment, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 333, 339 (2006) (finding, in an 
evaluation of a probation program and jail diversion programs, that increased access to and use of 
mental health services did not lead to a significant decrease in recidivism); Phyllis Solomon, Jeffrey 
Draine & Arthur Meyerson, Jail Recidivism and Receipt of Community Mental Health Services, 45 
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 793, 795 (1994) (finding that “a greater proportion of the clients 
assigned to receive intensive case management services from the [assertive community treatment] 
team returned to jail compared with clients assigned to individual case managers or referred to a 
[community mental health center]”).  
 307. Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 114. 
 308. Id. According to these researchers, existing data show that “offenders who (for whatever 
reason) show symptom improvement during a treatment program are no less likely to recidivate than 
those whose symptoms remain unchanged or worsen.” (emphasis added). Id. 
 309. See, e.g., Bonta, Law & Hanson, supra note 274, at 138; D.A. Andrews & James Bonta, 
Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 (2010); see 
also Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 121 (“Specifically, the effectiveness of 
correctional programs in reducing recidivism is positively associated with the number of criminogenic 
needs they target (i.e., dynamic risk factors for crime, like procriminal attitudes), relative to 
noncriminogenic needs (i.e., disturbances that impinge on an individual’s functioning in society, like 
depression . . .). Because mental illness is not a criminogenic need for this subgroup, it is important to 
target stronger factors for crime.”). 
 310. Ferguson, Ogloff & Thomson, supra note 251, at 8. 
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Our argument is that if [mental health] treatment services are 
offered with the intention of reducing recidivism, changes must be 
encouraged on criminogenic need factors. Offenders also have a 
right to the highest quality service for their other needs, but that is 
not the focus of correctional rehabilitation. Striving to change 
noncriminologic needs is unlikely to alter future recidivism 
significantly unless it indirectly impacts on a criminogenic need. 
We may make an offender feel better, which is important and 
valued, but this may not necessarily reduce recidivism.
311
 
Some researchers have speculated that, when programs directed at 
offenders with mental illnesses (such as mental health courts) do reduce 
recidivism, they do so by addressing offenders’ criminogenic risks, 
engaging in problem-solving strategies, and targeting situational factors 
that get an offender in trouble.
312
 
C. Implications 
The research on mental illness and crime is instructive for suggesting 
which populations should participate in mental health courts. First, a 
theory of therapeutic rehabilitation (premised on the belief that criminal 
behavior is symptomatic of mental illness) could justify mental health 
courts if the courts were limited to the small subset of offenders whose 
crimes actually stemmed from mental illnesses. In theory, treating the 
mental illnesses of these individuals should tend to decrease their 
likelihood of reoffending.
313
  
Second, a more capacious understanding of rehabilitation, based in part 
on social learning theory,
314
 may justify treating a broader cohort of 
individuals with mental illnesses. Instead of conceptualizing crime as 
simply the result of symptomatic mental illness, for instance, mental 
health courts could operate on the premise that the criminal behavior of 
individuals with mental illnesses is often motivated either by mental 
illness or by criminogenic needs related to mental illness. This 
understanding would support inviting offenders with mental illnesses to 
participate in mental health courts, regardless of the existence of a causal 
 
 
 311. ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 290, at 244; see also Silver, supra note 251, at 689 (“If 
mental disorder is only a small part of the problem, services aimed at its control can only be a small 
part of the solution.”). 
 312. Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 121. 
 313. See id. at 119–20. 
 314. See supra note 290. 
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link between their criminal act and mental illness symptoms, to address 
their criminogenic needs as well as to provide mental health treatment. 
This option may hold normative appeal, since individuals with mental 
illnesses may be as blameless for the generation of their criminogenic 
needs as for their illnesses.
315
  
Third, an even more capacious form of rehabilitation, conceptualizing 
crime as the product of criminogenic risks and needs, would support the 
creation of a newly constituted specialty court system devoted to 
addressing the dynamic risk factors of all high-risk offenders, mentally ill 
or not. Directing services to those offenders most at risk for recidivism is a 
central principle of effective correctional treatment.
316
 As Andrews and his 
colleagues have explained, “the effects of treatment typically are . . . 
greater among higher risk cases than among lower risk cases.”317 
Reserving intensive and extensive service for high-risk offenders should 
yield the greatest dividend in crime reduction.
318
  
Fourth, by broadening the stated goals of mental health courts beyond 
decreasing arrests or incidents of reconviction—which some mental health 
courts do
319—a theory of rehabilitation could potentially justify mental 
 
 
 315. As explained above, mental illness often leads to the generation of socio-demographic 
conditions linked with criminal activity, such as homelessness, unemployment, gain of antisocial 
acquaintances, and loss of prosocial support. See supra notes 225–27, 301–03. But the criminogenic 
risk factors of many, if not most, non-ill offenders also originate from sources beyond their control. 
See Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 12, at 197 (“[Persons with serious mental illness] often reside in 
highly criminogenic and impoverished environments that exert pressures on them to engage in 
criminal behaviors. The factors that characterize these environments (e.g., joblessness, gang 
influences, failed educational systems, and residential instability) also affect poor persons with no 
serious mental illness.”); John Monahan, The Psychiatrization of Criminal Behavior: A Reply, 24 
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 105, 107 (1973) (observing that “being born in a ghetto is more 
crimonogenic than being ‘mentally ill’”). It is unclear on what basis we should hold individuals with 
mental illnesses less responsible for their criminal acts (assuming mental illness was not a direct cause 
of their crimes), but not similarly excuse the acts of criminals born into poverty or subjected to 
pervasive discrimination. See Morse, supra note 216, at 627 (“Craziness is only a predisposing cause 
of other legally relevant behavior. If the law is unwilling to consider the relevance of other 
predisposing causes, such as poverty, to legal questions such as dangerousness or criminal 
responsibility, it is difficult to maintain a compelling argument that craziness is different and therefore 
should be relevant.”). 
 316. See Dowden & Andrews, supra note 299, at 451 (outlining three principles of effective 
correctional treatment); Skeem, Manchak & Peterson, supra note 15, at 122.  
 317. D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and 
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 374 (1990). 
 318. For empirical support of the risk principle, see, e.g., D.A. Andrews et al., supra note 317; 
D.A. Andrews & Jerry J. Kiessling, Program Structure and Effective Correctional Practices: A 
Summary of the CaVIC Research, in EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 439 (R.R. Ross & Paul 
Gendreau eds., 1980); Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, What Works for Female Offenders: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 438 (1999). 
 319. See, e.g., N.H. Mental Health Pilot Program PURPOSE, New Hampshire Court Rules 
(2010), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/20020224_mhcp.htm (identifying 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/2
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health courts as currently constituted. Rates of recidivism are often 
considered the most tangible and suitable outcome measures of 
rehabilitative treatment (and perhaps the most politically palatable), but 
other measures of social welfare—such as improvement in aspects of 
offenders’ psychological health, conduct, and life-style—could also serve 
as viable measures of success.
320
 Mental health courts may succeed at 
enhancing the human potential, psychological health, or welfare of 
offenders, even in the face of static re-arrest rates.
321
 Very little data has 
been collected on the extent to which the well-being of offenders is 
enhanced, beyond their capacity to conform to law-abiding behavior in the 
short-term.
322
  
 
 
the purpose of the Keene District Court PILOT project as including improved access to mental health 
treatment, improved well-being of identified defendants with mental illnesses, reduced recidivism, and 
public safety); JMHCP Grantee (2010)—Josephine County Community Justice and Mental Health 
Collaboration Project, http://www.consensusproject.org/program_examples/josephine_county_ 
community_justice_and_mental_health_collaboration_project (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (defining 
the goals of the project as “1) to improve collaboration among the adult criminal justice system, the 
juvenile justice system and the mental health system; 2) to better address the needs of people with 
mental illness; and 3) to increase public safety and promote positive outcomes for people with mental 
illnesses”); McHenry County, MCHENRY COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT—22ND JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT, http://www.co.mchenry.il.us/departments/courtadmin/Pages/MHealthCourtHome.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2012) (“The goals of the MHC program are to enhance public safety, reduce recidivism, 
improve participants’ mental health and promote self-sufficiency by offering cost effective [sic] 
alternatives to incarceration and hospitalization by connecting the defendants with community 
treatment services.”). 
 320. See DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 12–14 (1975) (listing 
a number of dependent variables used to measure the effectiveness of rehabilitation, including 
recidivism, vocational adjustment, educational achievement, drug and alcohol addiction abatement, 
personality and attitude change, and community adjustment); ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 121–22; 
Introduction, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 24 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994); id. (“We 
need to ask not just ‘what works’ to bring about for instance a reduction in the frequency of future 
offending, but also what we should count as ‘working’. Should the penal system be concerned only 
with reducing future offending, or also with other kinds of improvement in offenders’ conduct and 
circumstances? Should attention focus on individual offenders, and the attempt to change their 
behavior; or should more attention be paid to the social and economic circumstances which encourage 
crime, and upon which remedial efforts are too rarely focused?”); see also Interview with Stephen V. 
Manley, Judge, Mental Health Treatment Court, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., Ctr. for Court Innovation 
(Jan. 2005), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/stephen-v-manley-judge-adult-
criminal-drug-court-mental-health-treatment-court-and-family-d?url=research%2F39%2Finterview& 
mode=39&type=interview (“Success is small things: clients who are able to function, who learn how 
to take the bus, who learn to find a place to live that is somewhat permanent, who are able to get social 
security or their disability reinstated. I have different expectations and goals for every group of 
clients.”).  
 321. See ROTMAN, supra note 41, at 122 (“Enhancing the human potentialities of the offender is a 
specific feature of rehabilitative action, which is independent of its ultimately measurable outcome.”). 
 322. For a summary of evidence collected to date on measures of treatment compliance and 
improved mental health, see ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 4, at 25. 
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Finally, theories unrelated to rehabilitation might justify mental health 
courts. For instance, one could extrapolate from the Supreme Court’s 1997 
decision of Kansas v. Hendricks
323
 an argument that a separate system of 
justice is warranted for offenders with mental illnesses because of their 
diminished ability to control their behavior.
324
 Alternatively, one could 
argue that mental health courts serve as a means to eliminate the incidental 
suffering that offenders with mental illnesses experience when 
incarcerated,
325
 and that the elimination of that suffering is mandated by 
theories of proportionate punishment.
326
 In addition, it is possible (though 
perhaps unlikely) that mental health courts could have specific or general 
deterrent effects and could be supported by a theory of deterrence.
327
 
The viability of many of these theories, like the narrow form of 
therapeutic rehabilitation embraced by mental health courts, depends on 
the actual functioning and effect of mental health courts. Currently, very 
little data exists on the extent to which mental health courts are effective 
and why. To this end, I join the chorus of governmental bodies and 
commentators urging the collection of data on the extent to which mental 
health courts are successful in reducing recidivism and improving the 
psychological health and well-being of participants, as well as data on the 
eligibility requirements, procedures, and options of assistance offered by 
courts around the country.
328
 Data is essential both to assess the practical 
 
 
 323. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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benefit and cost-effectiveness of these courts and to identify best practices 
for emulation. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision to create a separate system of justice for a historically 
stigmatized population should be justified by a coherent and compelling 
theory of punishment or social welfare. This Article examines the efficacy 
of the two theories proposed by mental health court advocates—
therapeutic jurisprudence and a narrow form of therapeutic 
rehabilitation—and finds neither adequate to justify mental health courts 
as currently constituted. Therapeutic jurisprudence cannot justify the 
existence of mental health courts because, by definition, it is unable to 
resolve normative conflict. Therapeutic rehabilitation, on the other hand, 
fails to provide a coherent theory to support mental health courts because 
empirical evidence belies its central assumptions about the predictive link 
between mental illness and criminal behavior.  
While this Article contends that the two theories identified by mental 
health court advocates are inadequate to justify the current incarnation of 
mental health courts, other theories may fill the void. Some theories may 
justify the courts as they currently exist; others may support the diversion 
and treatment of a limited cohort of offenders with mental illnesses; still 
others may support treating a broader population if the purported ends of 
the courts were broadened beyond decreasing specific recidivism of 
offenders with mental illnesses. The viability of each of these theories 
depends on empirical data on the effect and workings of mental health 
courts. These courts potentially hold great promise, but more analysis is 
needed to examine whether a coherent and compelling theory can be 
offered to justify their existence. 
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